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I. INTRODUCTION
The environment is a mess. I do not mean that the environ-
ment is polluted, or unsightly, or ravaged by what humans have
done to it. To be sure, the environment is a mess in that sense in
many places, and that type of messiness is not outside the scope
of what follows in this Article. For the moment, however, the
mess to which I refer is the inherently chaotic and dynamical
state in which the environment exists. The environment in that
sense has been compared in its complexity to the human brain
and the global economy.1 The richness and diversity of ecological
systems in the environment defy our full grasp, as they are
"continually in flux and exhibit a wondrous panoply of interac-
tions such as mutualism, parasitism, biological arms races, and
mimicry .... Matter, energy, and information are shunted
around in complex cycles."2 In other words, the environment op-
erates in a state of highly complicated, organized disorder. In-
deed, scientists are beginning to understand that the disorder-
the chaos that is inherent in the environment-is its means of
sustainability.3
As for the other kind of mess-the one humans have made of
the environment-what seems most pernicious and insidious
about it is its capacity to cut through the dynamical qualities of
the environment. In other words, many of the consequences of
land use, resource development, and pollution undermine the di-
versity, chaos, and other adaptive qualities of the environment
that are essential to its long-term survival! Our use and degra-
dation of the environment through actions such as conversion of
wetlands to agriculture, logging in old growth forests, stream
channelization, dams on rivers, oil spills, and acid rain cannot
avoid undermining the dynamical messiness of the environment
L See James H. Brown, Complex Ecological Systems, in COMPLEITY:
METAPHORS, MODELS, AND REALIY 419,421 (George A. Cowan et al. eds., 1994).
2. JOHN H. HOLLAND, HIDDEN ORDER 3 (1995).
3. See id at 4 (stating that "the question of coherence under change is the
central enigma for each [complex system]").
4. See id (relating that our survival depends on our ability to use ecosystems
without destroying them).
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even when carried out using the best available means of envi-
ronmental protection.!
Neither of these themes is particularly new. Darwin her-
alded the flux of ecosystems as an agent of biological evolution.'
Rachel Carson awakened a generation of Americans to the ways
in which human actions interfere with environmental dynamics.'
What is new, however, is the method we can use to understand
the forces at play in the complex interaction of the environment
and human society. That method is complexity theory-the study
of complex adaptive systems.8
Complexity theory and the science of complex adaptive sys-
tems have radically altered the way in which scientists study
natural systems as mundane as a dripping faucet and as grand
as the weather.9 In fairness, the underlying subject matter of
complexity theory-nonlinear, irreversible behavior in complex
adaptive systems-has been a matter of scientific inquiry since
before Newton. For centuries, however, the classical scientific
method has approached such behavior in a reductionist manner
intent on studying components of whole systems at their most
5. This effect is often referred to as "environmental simplification." See Janet
N. Abramovitz, Valuing Nature's Services, in STATE OF THE WORLD 1997, 95, 108
(Linda Starke ed., 1997); see also HOLLAND, supra note 2, at 4 (stating that attempts
to "efficiently" turn tropical forest into farmland, or to fish the Grand Banks
'efficiently" are symptoms of a flawed approach that become more serious year by
year).
6. Many modem biologists credit Darwin as helping to establish the science of
ecology through his recognition that a "'web of complex relations' binds all of the
living things in any region." JONATHAN WEINER, THE BEAK OF THE FINCH 225 (1994)
(quoting Charles Darwin's Origin of Species). See also Peter Taylor, Community, in
KEYWORDS IN EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY 52 (Evelyn Fox Keller & Elisabeth A. Lloyd
eds., 1992) (describing Darwin's acknowledgment of the importance of ecological con-
texts).
7. See RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING 5 (1962) (stating that man is the first
species to actually mold its surroundings, rather than being molded by its sur-
roundings).
8. Complexity theory refers to the body of literature and research devoted to
"the study of the behavior of macroscopic collections of [interacting] units that are
endowed with the potential to evolve in time." PETER COVENEY & ROGER HIGHFELD,
FRONTIERS OF COMPLEXITY 7 (1995). Although the study of such systems can be
quite technical in substance, many of the recent and most influential works in the
field focus on applications of the technical theory to real world phenomena, such as
biological evolution. See, e.g., JOHN L. CASTI, COMPLEXIFICATION: EXPLAINING THE
PARADOXICAL WORLD 166-70 (1994) [hereinafter CASTI, COMPLEXIFICATION]; JACK
COHEN & IAN STEWART, THE COLLAPSE OF CHAOS 371-73 (1994); MURRAY GELL-
MANN, THE QUARK AND THE JAGUAR 235-60 (1994); BRIAN GOODWIN, HOW THE
LEOPARD CHANGED ITS SPOTS: THE EVOLUTION OF COMPLEXITY at x (1996). See gen-
erally STUART KAUFFMAN, AT HOME IN THE UNIVERSE (1995) [hereinafter
KAUFFMAN, AT HOME IN THE UNIVERSE]; STUART KAUFFMAN, THE ORIGINS OF
ORDER (1993) [hereinafter KAUFFMAN, ORIGINS OF ORDER].
9. See HOLLAND, supra note 2, at 1-4 (illustrating how complexity theory
guides understanding and study of how life continues in large cities and of micro-
scopic systems such as the human immune system).
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irreducible levels, based on the premise that by understanding
how each part works, we can understand the whole system.'"
With the advent of high-speed computers that allow system
modeling at levels of detail never before imagined, complexity
theory has shattered the classical reductionist methodology in
virtually every field of physical science and has emerged as an
important force in social sciences as well." As powerful as reduc-
tionism can be as a means of approximating system results-
Isaac Newton, after all, was a reductionist, and he explained
much about the physical world 2 -complexity theory shows that
the reductionist methodology will never lead to a fully predictive
theory of any complex system. 3
I believe that complexity theory has much to offer in our un-
derstanding of environmental law." Certainly anything that im-
10. By reductionism, I mean the "doctrine according to which complex phenom-
ena can be explained in terms of something simpler." COVENEY & HIGHFIELD, supra
note 8, at 432. Reductionism leads to the belief that an observable, complex phe-
nomenon can be studied and fully understood by first reducing it to the simplest, in-
divisible subcomponents in operation during the phenomenon, then studying each of
those subcomponents, and then reassembling them to gain a full understanding of
the rules of operation of the whole phenomenon. That form of reductionism has long
predominated as an organizing principle for classical scientific inquiry. See CASTI,
COMPLEXIFICATION, supra note 8, at 12-14 (providing a checklist of the characteris-
tics of scientific rules); COHEN & STEWART, supra note 8, at 33-34 (discussing the
reductionist approach and characterizing it as "the forefront of scientific methodol-
ogy").
11. For a discussion of the importance of computers to systems modeling and
the emergence of complexity theory, see JOHN L. CAST, WOULD-BE WORLDS 35
(1997). For histories of the development of complexity theory, which has been
brought about largely through the efforts of the Santa Fe Institute, see JAMES
GLEiK, CHAOS: MAKING A NEW SCIENCE 3-8 (1987); ROGER LEWIN, CO.MPLEXITY:
LIFE AT THE EDGE OF CHAOS 8-22 (1992). See generally M. MITCHELL WALDROP,
COmPLEXITY (1992). Current information about the field is best obtained from the
journal Complexity.
12 See MICHAEL H. HART, THE 100: A RANKING OF THE MOST INFLUENTIAL
PERSONS IN HISTORY 41-46 (Citadel Press 1987) (1978) (stating that Newton was the
most influential scientist in the development of scientific theory); JOHN SIMMIONS,
THE SCIENTIFIC 100: A RANKING OF THE MOST INFLUENTIAL SCIENTISTS, PAST AND
PRESENT 34 (1996) (characterizing Newton as the most influential figure in the his-
tory of Western science and crediting him with much of our knowledge of the physi-
cal world).
13. See HOLLAND, supra note 2, at 15-16 (stating that using linear functions to
study complex adaptive systems is "like trying to play chess by collecting statistics
on the way pieces move in the game"); GLEICK, supra note 11, at 3 (explaining that
"[wihere chaos begins, classical science stops"); GOODWIN, supra note 8, at vii-xiil
(explaining the limits in Darwin's approach to evolution).
14. Although the commentary on this subject is still quite nascent, I am glad to
be joined by at least a few other commentators in advocating a complex adaptive
systems approach for environmental law and policy. In an essay that provides an
excellent overview of the difficulties of the emerging environmental law issues and
politics and the "fit" between them and complex adaptive system qualities, Professor
Gerald Emison concludes that the use of complex adaptive systems theory "expands
the means for environmental protection so that innovation and improvement, rather
937
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proves our understanding of how the environment works, as
many scientists believe complexity theory has done, should also
improve our ability in the long run to manage the environmental
consequences of social activity. But my focus is not exclusively on
nature's dynamical environmental system; rather, we must also
consider the dynamical forces within the legal system we devise
to manage our impacts on the environment. Law, in other words,
has the capacity to operate as a complex adaptive system."
than control and protection, become the major functions of environmental quality
management." Gerald Andrews Emison, The Potential for Unconventional Progress:
Complex Adaptive Systems and Environmental Quality Policy, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y F. 167, 192 (1996). Emphasizing more the implementation of that model and
less the complex adaptive systems theory, Professor Alistair Iles outlines an excel-
lent approach to the adaptive management policy theme that I contend is most com-
patible with what the complex adaptive systems theory suggests must be the future
of environmental law. See Alastair Iles, Adaptive Management: Making Environ-
mental Law and Policy More Dynamic, Experimentalist and Learning, 10 ENVTL. &
PLAN. L.J. 288 (1996). For a similar argument linking complexity theory and sus-
tainable development, the policy principle which I contend is the most compatible
with the view of environmental law as a complex adaptive system, see generally
ANTHONY M. H. CLAYTON & NICHOLAS J. RADCLIFFE, SUsTAINABILITY: A SYsTEMs
APPROACH (1996). What I hope to offer in this Article, in addition to these highly
recommended readings, is a deeper examination of the case for using complex adap-
tive systems theory as a broad foundation for environmental law and policy and a
more explicit connection between that theoretical foundation and the practical or-
ganizing principles for implementation.
15. Elsewhere, I have laid out the basic model of how the sociolegal system can
be portrayed as a complex adaptive system and how the findings of complexity the-
ory can contribute to an understanding of the mechanics of how that system behaves
and evolves. See J.B. Ruhl & Harold J. Ruhl, Jr., The Arrow of the Law in Modern
Administrative States: Using Complexity Theory to Reveal the Diminishing Returns
and Increasing Risks the Burgeoning of Law Poses to Society, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
405, 407 (1997) [hereinafter Ruhl & Ruhl, Arrow of Law] (discussing the direction in
which the behavioral and evolutionary mechanics are leading the sociolegal system
given its current transient state); see also J.B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Para-
digm for the Dynamical Law-and-Society System: A Wake-Up Call for Legal Reduc-
tionism and the Modern Administrative State, 45 DUKE L. J. 849, 927 (1996)
[hereinafter Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm] (arguing that law and society
coexist interdependently and dynamically similar to the behavior of nonlinear sys-
tems in the physical world); J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory
to Describe the Evolution of Law and Society and Its Practical Meaning for Democ-
racy, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1407, 1419-37 (1996) [hereinafter Ruhl, Fitness of Law]
(discussing the general evolutionary model). For additional descriptions of how com-
plexity theory or branches of it help explain how law behaves and evolves generally,
see Vincent Di Lorenzo, Legislative Chaos: An Exploratory Study, 12 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 425, 432-35 (1994) (developing a model for legislative decisionmaking
based on chaos theory); Thomas Earl Geu, The Tao of Jurisprudence: Chaos, Brain
Science, Synchronicity, and the Law, 61 TENN. L. REV. 933, 934-35 (1994)
(discussing the potential significance of chaos and emergence to legal theory); An-
drew W. Hayes, An Introduction to Chaos and Law, 60 UMKC L. REV. 751, 764-73
(1992) (containing a general discussion of chaos theory and its application to judicial
decision making); Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109
HARV. L. REV. 641, 643-65 (1996) (describing legal evolution according to path de-
pendence theory and chaotic systems theory); Robert E. Scott, Chaos Theory and the
938 [34:933
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In this Article, I explore the significance of that proposition
for environmental law. Understanding law as a complex adaptive
system brings into focus three major themes for environmental
law. The first theme, explored in Part I of this Article, is that the
subject matter of environmental law consists of interlinked com-
plex adaptive systems. The foundation of complexity theory is
the study of five behavioral properties of complex adaptive sys-
tems that lead to their sustainability: (1) the aggregation of a
system's many component parts; 6 (2) the dissipative flow of en-
ergy, information, or other mediums through the system; 7 (3) the
nonlinear path of system evolution; (4) the diversity of system
components and behavior; ' and (5) the drive toward self-critical
behavior as the stable nonequilibrium system state.' Complexity
theory demonstrates that these behaviors must exist for the system
Justice Paradox, 35 WM. & MARYL. REV. 329, 329-31 (1993) (applying chaos theory
to the legal dilemma between "present justice" and "future justice"); and Kenton K.
Yee, Coevolution of Law and Culture: A Coevolutionary Games Approach, CO.N1-
PLEXrTY, Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 4 (describing attempts to mathematically model evolu-
tion of common law according to complex adaptive systems dynamics). Several other
works discuss complexity theory or its branches, sometimes very briefly, in specific
legal settings. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Capital Market Theory, Mandatory
Disclosure, and Price Discovery, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 843, 854-59 (1994)
(applying chaos theory to capital market regulation); Lawrence A. Cunningham,
From Random Walks to Chaotic Crashes: The Linear Genealogy of the Efficient
Capital Market Hypothesis, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 546, 581-92 (1994) (discussing
the application of chaos theory to capital market regulation); Michael J. Gerhardt,
The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Decisionmaking and Theory, 60 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 68, 114-15 (1991) (explaining Supreme Court constitutional jurisprudence
using, among other mediums, a discussion of chaos theory); Alistair M. Hanna, The
Land Use System, 13 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 531, 538 (1996) (discussing application of
chaos theory and self-organization theory to land use regulation system); Glenn
Harlan Reynolds, Chaos and the Court, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 110, 112-15 (1991)
(explaining Supreme Court constitutional jurisprudence using chaos theory); Wil-
liam I. Rodgers, Jr., Where Environmental Law and Biology Meet: Of Pandas'
Thumbs, Statutory Sleepers, and Effective Law, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 25, 46-48 (1993)
(discussing chaos theory surfacing in evolutionary biology commentary as a meta-
phor for evolution of environmental law); see also MWCHEL VAN DE KERCHOVE &
FRANCOIS OST, LEGAL SYSTEM BETWEEN ORDER AND DISORDER 102-77 (lain Stewart
trans., 1994) (discussing order-disorder tensions in legal systems); Eric Kades, The
Laws of Complexity and the Complexity of Laws: The Implications of Computational
Complexity Theory for the Law, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 403, 452-54, 476 (1997)
(focusing on mathematically complex issues as they arise in law, such as cyclical pri-
ority issues in liens and property titles); Lynn AL LoPucki, The Systems Approach to
Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 479, 480-82 (1997) (advocating an empiricist "systems ap-
proach" to legal analysis).
16. See HOLLAND, supra note 2, at 10-12.
17. See id. at 23-27.
18. See id at 15-23.
19. See id. at 27-31.
20. Refer to part ILA.5 infra (discussing the self critical behavior of complex
adaptive systems).
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to adapt successfully over the long run in the face of external dis-
turbances. Based on a burgeoning wealth of unfolding research
in complexity theory being undertaken in a variety of fields, I
demonstrate that these properties are found in many of the sys-
tems that are the subject matter of environmental law, such as
ecosystems, technology, economies, and land use.
The realization that environmental law is fundamentally an
endeavor to regulate many complex adaptive systems leads to
the second theme, examined in Part II of this Article, which is
that our present framework of environmental law is designed as
if its subject matter is dictated by uniformitarianism2 rather
than a set of dynamic, adaptive systems. Complex adaptive sys-
tems, because of their highly collectivized, nonlinear, dynamic
behavior, defy prediction through classical reductionist method,
or any other known method for that matter. Yet we have not de-
signed our environmental law system with this underlying prop-
erty in mind. Rather, it is mired in a reductionist, linear, predic-
tivist mentality ignorant of underlying complex system
behaviors. We find ourselves, as a result, constantly befuddled
when the intended benefits of environmental regulation fail to
materialize or, worse, when consequences contrary to the in-
tended effects materialize. To be sure, the coercive, regulatory,
command-and-control state has produced some admirable results
in terms of environmental protection,2 but the underlying reduc-
tionist premises of that approach have exhausted their useful-
ness and will never allow us to tackle the significant environ-
mental challenges ahead.
These first two themes lead to the third theme-challenging
the entrenched mentality of environmental law to move beyond
the popular "reinvention" rhetoric that has emerged as many
policy makers have recognized the need for reform to a fully
revolutionized environmental law based on the complex adaptive
system model.' To manage the impact of human society on the
inherently chaotic, adaptive environment, the environmental law
system itself must possess those dynamical qualities. While
many practitioners and commentators consider environmental
21. Uniformitarianism is the philosophy of gradual change advocated by
Charles Lyell in the 1830s. See Richard Monastersky, The Call of Catastrophes, 151
SCI. NEws S20, S20 (1997). It posits that "the history of the world has been shaped
by the same slow processes that can be seen today wearing away mountains or re-
placing one species with another. Because no one has ever witnessed a planet-
wrenching impact, uniformitarians regarded such events as an outlandish explana-
tion for past extinctions." Id.
22. Refer to note 202 infra and accompanying text (describing the success of
the federal acid rain program).
23. Refer to Part IV infra (discussing the need to view the environment and
environmental law as complex adaptive systems).
940 [34:933
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law a mess, they mean so principally in the sense that it is a top-
heavy, recondite infrastructure of regulatory prescriptions de-
signed to centralize power, divide issues into sub-sub-sub-issues,
tightly manage outcomes, and thereby generally confuse every
person responsible for enforcing or complying with its require-
ments. 24 That mess-that nonadaptive heap of prescriptive and
proscriptive commandments-has cut through the kind of
messiness we need in environmental law. The adaptive, dynami-
cal, sometimes chaotic forces found in complex adaptive systems
must be present if the legal system is to respond effectively and
creatively to the very same qualities present in the environment
and society. But the baby steps of incremental "reinvention" and
the blind leap of faith into total "deregulation," the two models of
reform most often advanced today,' are misguided responses
based on outdated conceptions of law and society that conceal the
complex adaptive nature of the legal system. Unless environ-
mental law sheds its traditional premises and methods, the
findings of complexity theory suggest we will not achieve the
kind of environmental law system needed to confront our
changing future.
Those three themes establish the premises of my ultimate
argument, that a truly radical transformation of environmental
law is needed. In Part HI of this Article, I outline what this
revolution of environmental law must entail. Five key questions,
each corresponding to a quality of complex adaptive systems,
must be addressed. First, what is the appropriate aggregation
and distribution of environmental policy decision making enti-
ties? Second, how can the decision making process be made more
nonlinear and thus more flexible? Third, how can we most effi-
ciently and effectively promote the flow of relevant information
through the environmental law system? Fourth, how can the di-
versity of the environmental law system, particularly the spec-
trum of available legal tools and outcomes, be maintained? Fifth,
how can environmental law reform take place fast enough to
keep up with its evolving subject matter, but nonetheless form a
stable base from which legal, business, environmental, and other
social institutions can operate? These questions go to the very
heart of environmental law as we presently know it, and they
suggest that merely tinkering at the edges will not suffice if we
24. See J.B. Ruh, Malpractice and Environmental Law: Should Environmental
Law "Specialists" Be Worried?, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 173, 180-92 (1996) (describing the
complexities of environmental law and the potential malpractice threats they pose).
25. Refer to Part IH.B infra and accompanying text (discussing the policy re-
sponse of the Clinton Administration and the Republican-controlled 104 Congress).
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truly wish to "reinvent" environmental law in a way that will
have lasting significance.
I close the discussion in Part III with a description of the
framework for redesigning the structure and schemata of envi-
ronmental law that will respond to those issues in a context most
amenable to allowing the complex adaptive system forces to take
hold and flourish. This replacement involves nothing less than
replacing the basic organizing principles of environmental law
with new ones-a revolution of environmental law to its deepest
roots. First, the policy must be focused on the goal of achieving
long term global sustainable development. Second, the decision
making process must be modeled around principles of adaptive
management. Finally, the performance measurement for deter-
mining whether the process is attaining the policy must use bio-
logical diversity as its central standard. These concepts inde-
pendently have become familiar in recent years. It is no
exaggeration to portray them as the three legs of a newly
emerging environmental law system. What I hope to offer to the
burgeoning commentary on their shapes and uses is the explora-
tion of the science of complex adaptive systems as a model for
the integration of these three revolutionary concepts into a com-
posite whole that will more successfully allow each to be defined
and fulfilled. Only then will we be able to think of environmental
law as a complex adaptive system.
II. THE SUBJECT MATTER OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW CONSISTS OF
COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS
Complex adaptive systems combine qualities of coherent
stability and disordered change to produce sustaining, adaptive
performance over the long run.26 Five important features of com-
plex adaptive systems explain how they are able to balance sta-
bility and change to produce this outcome. First, they perform
according to complex, large-scale behaviors that emerge from the
aggregate interactions of less complex agents, such as how the
trends of macroeconomic scale represent the aggregate behavior
of many individual firms or investors. 7 Second, the interactions
of the system exhibit unpredictable, nonlinear relationships in-
capable of being neatly plotted as straight line formulae, as re-
vealed in the complex dynamics of many predator-prey popula-
tions.' Third, the complex adaptive system can be described
26. See HOLLAND, supra note 2, at 4 (stating that a characteristic shared by
complex adaptive systems is "coherence under change").
27. See id. at 11.
28. See id. at 15-23 (using mathematical equations to illustrate the complexity
[34:933942
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through the varied flows of its mediums-fluids, money, energy,
information, and so on-just as the weather reporter traces the
jet stream to describe storm patterns.' Fourth, complex adaptive
systems are defined by their diverse ingredients and context, as
in how a biologist might describe the diverse species in an eco-
system.3 Fifth, all four of these properties combine into self-
organizing critical state behavior through which change is trans-
formed into a stabilizing rather than disrupting force." The com-
plex adaptive system thus operates in a state of ordered disor-
der, primed to adapt to external forces and to evolve with, rather
than separate from, its environment.
Not surprisingly, after almost two decades of developing the
model of complex adaptive systems, some researchers believe
these systems are found throughout nature (e.g., the weather,
ecosystems, earthquakes, genetics, and evolution) and through-
out human organizational behavior (e.g., in economic activity,
politics, and technological development).' This model has pro-
found implications for environmental law, which is about regu-
lating human behavior on behalf of nature. The subject matter of
environmental law, in other words, consists of complex adaptive
systems, and hence it behooves environmental policy decision
makers to examine what the science of complex adaptive systems
has to say about how such systems behave, evolve, and co-evolve.
A- The General Properties of Complex Adaptive Systems
The basic research instrument of complexity theory is the
high-speed computer which allows us to study natural and hu-
man systems as no other tool ever has.' The systems under
study have not changed much in centuries-the weather, the solar
system, economies, ecosystems, and so on-but our understanding
in this seemingly simple interrelation).
29. See id at 23-27
30. See id. at 27-31.
31. Refer to Part I-A.5 infra (noting the self critical behavior of complex adap-
tive systems).
32. See, e.g., PER BAY, How NATURE WORKS 9-32 (1996) (discussing the evi-
dence of complex adaptive behavior in sandpiles, biological evolution, ecosystems,
earthquakes, and brain functions). The underlying premise of complexity theory is
that "similar patterns of activity can arise in systems that differ greatly from one
another in their composition and in the nature of their parts .... They all show
similar types of dynamic activity-rhythms, waves that propagate in concentric cir-
cles or spirals that annihilate when they collide, and chaotic behavior." GOODWIN,
supra note 8, at 77.
33. See CAsTI, WOULD-BE WORLDs, supra note 11, at 35 (relating that afford-
able, high-quality computing systems allow us to construct theories of complex
physical, social, biological, and behavioral processes).
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of those systems has changed dramatically as a result of ad-
vancements in the tools of study. 4 The telescope, for example,
radically altered our perception of the heavens as a system.'5
High-speed computers have done so for all systems, as they have
allowed us even to conjure up the image of complex adaptive be-
havior as a property of systems we have been studying for eons.
And the implications of this new way of viewing systems are not
merely superficial. It may be too soon to tell whether complexity
theory represents a scientific revolution in the Kuhnian sense,
36
but it is not too soon to say that complexity theory, despite its
detractors, has pushed its way into the forefront of research in
virtually every field of physical and social science.37 Although
much of that research and its literature are presented in techni-
cal terms,38 the unquestionable essence of the work is the devel-
opment of a new theoretical understanding of how the world be-
haves. That theory can be summarized through the description of
five key behavioral qualities.39
34. See id.
35. See A. C. CROMBIE, AUGUSTINE To GALILEO 275 (1953) (explaining that
many important aspects of the scientific revolution were carried through before the
invention of the telescope which later became indispensable).
36. Thomas S. Kuhn is credited by most historians of science as developing the
benchmark theory of the criteria by which new scientific theories are measured in
terms of their transformative effect on science in general. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE
STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962).
37. For example, in his recent and much-heralded overview of the current state
of science, science historian John Horgan postulated that science is increasingly di-
minishing in its importance to human progress and questioned whether complexity
theory could reverse that trend. Nevertheless, he devoted two full chapters and
parts of several others to a discussion of complexity theory. See JOHN HORGAN, TI-IE
END OF SCIENCE (1996). Social scientists have gravitated to complexity theory as
well. See generally CHAOS, COMPLEXITY, AND SOCIOLOGY (Raymond A. Eve et al.
eds., 1997) (providing an extensive discussion of complexity theory applications in
various sociological contexts).
38. As an example, look at any copy of the journal Complexity.
39. For a brief explanation of these qualities and how they can be used to
evaluate mediation, see J.B. Ruhl, Thinking of Mediation as a Complex Adaptive
System, 1997 BYU L. REV. 777. Many readers will be familiar with some of the tech-
nical concepts used in complexity theory to describe complex adaptive system struc-
ture and dynamics, such as phase space, trajectory, strange attractors, sensitivity,
fractals, and so on. Elsewhere, I have outlined how those concepts provide a theo-
retical foundation for applying complexity theory to sociolegal structure and dy-
namics in general. See Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm, supra note 15, at
927 (observing that law and society interact in a nonlinear dynamical manner simi-
lar to that which scientists have observed in other natural and social systems). In
this Article, I assume that those foundational structures are present, and I am con-
cerned principally with describing the behavioral qualities they produce and with
applying them in specific sociolegal settings. The distinction might be thought of as
being between theory and application.
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1. Aggregation. By limiting observation to an individual
ant-its foraging, building, defending, and so on-it is highly
unlikely the observer could accurately predict the behavior of the
ant colony.' The ant colony, unlike an individual ant, is highly
adaptive, surviving over time periods far in excess of individual
ant lives and in the face of a variety of environmental hazards,
any one of which poses death to individual ants. This pattern of
adaptive collective behavior emerging from the interconnected
parts is found throughout nature and human society.'
Even when the individual parts of a system are unaware of
or indifferent to their mutual effects or are even working against
each other, emergent collective behavior may become highly
adaptive and, we can only hope, beneficial to the collective whole.
Research has suggested that the magnitude and direction of this
effect depend on the number of decision making components, or
patches as they are known in the complex adaptive systems lit-
erature,42 and how tightly intertwined, or "coupled," are their de-
cision making processes.' The problem is that for a multi-patch,
coupled decision making system, there is no reliable way to pre-
dict, simply on the basis of observation of any of the system's in-
dividual patches, what form the system's emergent behaviors
40. See HOLLAND, supra note 2, at 11 (observing that while an individual ant is
weak, an ant colony is strong and highly adaptive).
41. Emergence is "a process that leads to the appearance of structure not di-
rectly described by the defining constraints and instantaneous forces that control a
system." James P. Crutchfield, Is Anything Euer New?: Considering Emergence, in
COMPLEXITY: METAPHORS, MODELS, AND REALITY at 515, 516 (George A. Cowan et
al. eds., 1994). Cohen and Stewart explain that the key to understanding why emer-
gence occurs lies in the number of system components and their interaction; with
increasing numbers of system components, eventually the sum effect of the interac-
tions between the components becomes a dominating characteristic of the system.
See COHEN & STEWART, supra note 8, at 182. The result is that
if the effect of any particular interaction is tiny, we may not be able to work
out what it is. We can't study it on its own, in a reductionist manner, be-
cause it's too small; but we can't study it as part of the overall system, be-
cause we can't separate it from all the other interactions.
Id.
42 See KAUFFLAN, AT HOME IN THE UNIVERSE, supra note 8, at 247 (observing
that breaking an organization into "patches" where each patch acts in its own self
interest, even if it is harmful to the whole, sometimes leads to the welfare of the
whole organization).
43. See id at 252-53 (summarizing the patch procedure which requires divid-
ing a difficult task with interacting parts into nonoverlapping patches; as each patch
optimizes within itself, the problem to be solved by the other patches is altered). The
study of interconnected systems is a major research focus of complexdty theory. The
general model is of so-called NK systems, where N is the number of system compo-
nents (patches) and K is the number of inputs from other components that each
component needs in order to know what to do next in the system (coupling). By con-
structing computer models of NK systems, complexity theory researchers can study
the effects of altering N and K in different combinations. See id. at 172-73.
945
HeinOnline  -- 34 Hous. L. Rev. 945 1997-1998
HOUSTON LAW REVIEW
might take and to what end. You have to let the whole system
run to see what happens.'
2. Nonlinearity. If we were to study the relationship
between a population of foxes and one of rabbits living in the
same ecosystem, a reasonable starting proposition might be that
as the fox population increases the rabbit population will drop.
Over time, however, a declining rabbit population will fail to
support an increasing fox population, and foxes will begin to
decline. Eventually, rabbits might bounce back, allowing foxes to
increase in number again, and so on. Add hawks and mice into
the picture and soon it becomes very difficult to predict what any
species population will be, based on the figures available in the
present for the other species. The relationships between the
predator and prey species populations have become nonlinear."
Nonlinearity means that the relationships of system compo-
nents we wish to measure, even though they may be determinis-
tically related, do not exhibit mathematical proportionality." In-
deed, despite the neat and orderly world implied by classical
mathematics and science, most of the world is governed by non-
linearity and its inherent unpredictability. This so-called deter-
ministic randomness of nonlinearity is the behavioral trait
known in complexity theory as chaos.47 A system exhibiting such
44. See id. at 288-89 (noting that "formal undecidability" means that we cannot
predict certain things). This "incompressibility" of the evolution of complex adaptive
systems that is inherent in the chaotic behavior is a necessary component if the sys-
tem is to be adaptive. In other words, "[there is no faster way of finding out how a
chaotic system will evolve than to watch its evolution. The dynamical system itself is
its own fastest computer." Roderick V. Jensen, Classical Chaos, 75 AM. SCIENTIST
168, 179 (1987).
45. See HOLLAND, supra note 2, at 16-18 (providing a lynx-hare model to dem-
onstrate the nonlinear relationship between predator and prey).
46. A system is described as linear when the relationship of the agents' interac-
tions can be described in strictly proportional terms (e.g., y = 2x + 3z). A system is
nonlinear, therefore, if the relationships of the agents represents a function in which
the output of an element is not proportional to its input. See P.G. DRAZIN, NON-
LINEAR SYSTEMS 1 (1992) (stating that a nonlinear system represents a feedback
loop in which an element's output is not proportionate to its input).
47. Chaos behavior thus has been described as "order masquerading as ran-
domness." GLEICK, supra note 11, at 22. Classic examples of chaos in physical sys-
tems run by deterministic rules are the erratic dripping patterns from water faucets
and the motion of a pinball. See Tom Mullin, Turbulent Times for Fluids, in EX.
PLORING CHAOS 59 (Nina Hall ed., 1991); Ian Percival, Chaos: A Science for the Real
World, in EXPLORING CHAOS 11 (Nina Hall ed., 1991). Although the rules determin-
ing the presence of chaos in such systems may be simple and rigid, the randomness
of the system's behavior prevents easy discovery of all the rules merely by observa-
tion of the behavior. Thus, chaotic behavior "only looks complicated because you
don't know what the rule is." COHEN & STEWART, supra note 8, at 197. More to the
point, even if you did know what the rule is, thus making the system computable,
you couldn't predict what will happen very far into the future.
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chaotic behavior is extremely sensitive to the environmental
conditions in which the system exists. This property, known as
sensitivity, means that two similar systems found at one time to
be located at very close points can later be found to have di-
verged from one another wildly."s Chaotic systems thus have a
propensity to experience an arbitrarily large divergence in be-
havior based on arbitrarily small changes in system variables,
making prediction of the system's future course very difficult, if
not impossible in the true sense of the word.
Although the lack of predictability is a nagging aspect of
complex adaptive systems, researchers have found that the most
robust systems are those which manage to stay balanced be-
tween extreme order and extreme chaos."5 While nonlinearity
may be a nuisance for purposes of predicting system behavior, it
is precisely the ability to bend and to avoid being locked into
rigidly linear behavior that allows complex adaptive systems to
adapt to changing circumstances.'0 In a sense, these systems are
drawing as much as possible from the adaptive qualities of non-
linearity without falling all the way into disaster. They are being
held back from the edge by the presence of ordered, linear be-
havioral qualities in the system. A system poised in this manner
"at the edge of chaos" is likely to be adaptive and successful-in
other words, a complex adaptive system. 1
3. Flows. Generally speaking, the force of change in
complex adaptive systems-what makes them dynamical-
involves a flow of some medium.2 In an economy, for example,
money and the factors of production move throughout the system
from component to component. When such flows take place in
48. See CASTI, COMPLEXIFICATION, supra note 8, at 91-92.
49. Thus, "complex systems constructed such that they are poised on the
boundary between order and chaos are the ones best able to adapt by mutation and
selection. Such poised systems appear to be best able to coordinate complex, flexible
behavior and best able to respond to changes in their environment." KAUFFMAN,
ORIGINS OF ORDER, supra note 8, at 29. Most long-lived evolutionary systems thus
are inherently unpredictable because they are designed to adapt to the inherent un-
predictability of their environment. See Peter Schuster, How Does Complexity Arise
in Evolution, COMPiLEXITY, Sept.-Oct. 1996, at 22, 22 (describing unpredictability as
an integral force in biological evolution).
50. See KAUFFAIAN, ORIGINS OF ORDER, supra note 8, at 29 (stating that com-
plex systems poised between order and chaos may adapt by mutation and selection).
51 See HOLLAND, supra note 2, at 4 (observing that complex adaptive systems
share the common characteristic of coherence under change). Some theorists call the
complex behavior region the "edge of chaos." KAUFFMAN, ORIGINS OF ORDER, supra
note 8, at 31.
52. A nonlinear system is considered dynamical if the (nonproportional) rela-
tionships of the agents evolve with time or with some variable like time. See DRAzIN,
supra note 46, at 1.
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the context of complex adaptive systems experiencing
aggregation and nonlinearity, the flows themselves exhibit
complex, circuitous paths known as feedback loops. 3 The
multiplier effect in economic theory, for example, explains how
money transferred at one stage of a series of transactions moves
from stage to stage and amplifies the effect of the initial
transfer.54 Such feedback loops can become exponential in effect
and thus dominate the system in which they operate."
These and similar relationships tend to be dissipative in
that they work in one direction but not in the other.6 If the flows
are reversed, it is not possible for the system components in a
complex adaptive system simply to retrace their steps. New
feedback loops may emerge, the old ones may change strength or
direction, and new possibilities for the system open up. Hence,
complex adaptive systems depend on their flow patterns to pro-
vide the momentum that both strengthens and regularizes the
aggregation and nonlinearity effects, thus enhancing long term
adaptiveness.
4. Diversity. A single tree in a tropical rainforest ecosystem
can harbor over ten thousand distinct species of insects, and it is
possible to walk long distances in the rainforest without twice
encountering the same species of tree.57 Diversity of such
53. Adaptation is associated with the feedback and feedforward loops made
possible by multiple paths of interactions between system components and thus "is
an emergent property which spontaneously arises through the interaction of simple
components." GLEICK, supra note 11, at 339. Loops of this kind allow the system to
"restructure, or at least modify, the interaction pattern among its variables," CASTI,
COMPLEXIICATION, supra note 8, at 271.
54. See HOLLAND, supra note 2, at 23-27, 84-87.
55. See Douglas S. Robertson & Michael C. Grant, Feedback and Chaos in
Darwinian Evolution, COMPLEXITY, Sept.-Oct. 1996, at 10, 12-14.
56. The Belgian Nobel laureate Ilya Prigogine defined a dissipative system as
one for which the driving force is the nonequilibrium flux of matter and energy
through the system that increases order and sustainability in the system but makes
reversing the system impossible. See Tony Rothman, Irreversible Differences, THE
SCIENCES, July-Aug. 1997, at 26, 29-31 (discussing the implications of Prigogine's
theory for theories of time and space). Because these systems experience nonequilib-
rium in terms of input, they necessarily cannot be "reversed" so as to replicate the
conditions of the system at a prior point in time. See KAUFFMAN, AT HOME IN THE
UNIVERSE, supra note 8, at 23 (observing that small changes in initial conditions of-
ten lead to profound changes in a chaotic system and stating that, for this reason, it
is often impossible to discern the initial conditions). For example, suppose that
Company A is ordered to compensate Company B for illegal overcharges, that is, re-
versing the flow of money between the two entities. The economic impacts associated
with the multiplier effect that occurred when Company B first paid Company A,
such as payments Company A made to its vendors and employees with the proceeds
of Company B's payment, do not also unwind to their original state. Rather, a new
multiplier effect occurs, and the system reaches a new state.
57. See HOLLAND, supra note 2, at 27.
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magnitude is the signature of complex adaptive systems. "s As
diversity increases, each component of the system becomes less
able to duplicate the whole and more resigned to relating to
other system components through its particularized niche.'
Through competition and cooperation, niches become
increasingly differentiated, and the number of different niches
grows." The diversification of components in turn adds to the
emergent effects of aggregation, makes system nonlinearity even
more unpredictable, and opens the door to more complicated and
far ranging flows and feedback loops.6" Because more is possible
in such a system, more is done, more efficiently, than in simpler
systems.!
At this stage the system as a whole depends on no single
component for its long term sustainability. Thus, difficult choices
have to be made as to the overall structure of the system-
should it favor the traits of this component, or of that compo-
nent; should there be more of these components, or of those com-
ponents; and so on. Complexity theory research suggests that
within any complex adaptive system there exist "conflicting con-
straints" between different possible combinations of components'
structural traits.' These constraints limit the degree to which
any one trait can be adjusted without causing failure or degrada-
tion of another constraint.' In considering how it should be
58. See id. (discussing the inherent diversity in complex adaptive systems).
59. See HOLLAND, supra note 2, at 27 (stating that in a diverse system each
agent fills a particular niche and if any agent is removed from the system, the sys-
tem will adapt until a new agent is found to occupy the hole).
60. See KAUFFMtAN, AT HOME IN THE UNIVERSE, supra note 8, at 282-83 (using
the example of how production and consumption complement and substitute the
niches of an economic web).
61. See id. at 296-97 (stating that diversity leads to more diversity, which leads
to complexity).
62. See F. Stuart Chapin M et al, Biotic Control ouer the Functioning of Eco-
systems, 277 SCIENCE 500, 500 (1997) (observing that a diverse environment pro-
vides opportunities for more efficient use of resources).
63. See KAUFFMAN, AT HOME IN THE UNIVERSE, supra note 8, at 169-73 (using
a model of a genoic network to show that the more interconnected genes are, the
more likely it is that conflicting constraints will exist).
64. The exoskeleton of an ant, for example, presents tremendous advantages
for the size of an ant, but if ant size were to increase, eventually the proportional
weight of the exoskeleton would result in the ant's demise. As Kauffman explains:
Here is the problem: in a fixed environment, the contribution of one trait-
say, short versus long nose-to the organism's fitness might depend on other
traits-for example, bowed versus straight legs. Perhaps having a short nose
is very useful if one is also bowlegged, but a short nose is harmful if one is
straight legged ....
In short, the contribution to overall fitness of the organism of one state of
one trait may depend in very complex ways on the states of many other
traits.
Id. at 170. For a more extensive analysis of how conflicting constraints emerge from
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structured, therefore, the system has to evaluate the effects of
changing one trait based on the overall effects on fitness by tak-
ing all other traits into consideration. Thus, we can envision a
landscape of varying fitness level potentials for the system in a
given environment with the peaks, valleys, and plains of the
landscape representing the fitness potential of different combi-
nations of system structures.65 Indeed, we can construct such a
fitness landscape for any system of connected interactions. The
presence of such conflicting constraints will make the landscape
flat or rugged and multipeaked-a fitness landscape."
The fitness landscape metaphor improves our understanding
of how systems use aggregation, nonlinearity, flows, and diver-
sity to evolve. The objective of adaptive change in the system is
to stay on the high parts of this landscape in the face of outside
disturbances. 7 The mechanics of moving over the landscape,
therefore, are of great interest to the system. The system might
"walk16 across the landscape through gradual, incremental test-
ing of altered variable combinations, hoping to find a higher
spot.68 But that mode of travel is slow and prevents the system
from quickly testing faraway points in the hope of finding peaks
significantly higher than those available in the nearby land-
scape.69 In other words, the system might find a way to "jump"
across the landscape at greater distances, as risky as that might
be.7" Indeed, by tapping into the dynamic forces of the system,
the diversity property of the legal system to form a fitness landscape for sociolegal
evolution, see Ruhl, Fitness of Law, supra note 15, at 1448-56.
65. See KAUFFMAN, AT HOME IN THE UNIVERSE, supra note 8, at 26 (relating
that biologists envision "fitness landscapes, where the peaks represent high fitness,
and populations wander... across the landscape seeking peaks, but perhaps never
achieving them").
66. In the field of evolutionary biology, for example, Kauffman states that
[a]daptation is usually thought of as a process of "hill climbing" through mi-
nor variations toward "peaks" of high fitness on a fitness landscape. And
natural selection is thought of as "pulling" an adapting population towards
such peaks. We can imagine a mountain range on which populations of or-
ganisms... are feeling their way to the summits.
Id. at 154.
67. See id. at 27 (describing a fitter organism as being higher on the fitness
landscape).
68. The rules of the "adaptive walk" are simple. Start from wherever the spe-
cies is on its fitness landscape and consider the fitness level that results when a
randomly chosen gene is altered. If it is a fitter level, go there; if it is not a fitter
level, try again. See id. at 166.
69. See id. at 167 (stating that searching for fitness peaks through adaptive
walks is not an efficient way of searching).
70. See id. at 193 (describing how simultaneously making a large number of
mutations allows organisms to take long jumps across the fitness landscape and that
the fitness value the organism lands on will be totally random with respect to the
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which can trigger large shifts in the system behavior based on
small changes in system variables, a very long jump may indeed
be possible, though its destination will be unpredictable." Thus,
diversity, which defines the terrain of the fitness landscape, is
the driving force behind evolutionary success in complex adap-
tive systems.
5. Self-Criticality. Successful complex adaptive systems are
constantly changing to maintain adaptability, but they also
exhibit a stability of basic structure in the face of externally
caused stress. How do they manage to achieve this state of stable
nonequilibrium? Some complexity theory researchers believe
they have found the answer in what is known as self-organized
criticality or self-critical behavior.' Simply put, self-critical
behavior is a means of relieving system stress by integrating
small local "avalanches" into the regular system behavior rather
than waiting for the big crash to do the job across a larger span
of the system-the way an area of tectonic activity might
produce thousands of small tremors in order to avoid a severe
earthquake.73 Systems thus regulate complexity of structure
fitness value from which the organism began).
71. Such events in nature are often known as accidents. The power of acci-
dent-that is, of the chaos, emergence, and catastrophe that small accidents can
unleash-should not be underestimated. Starting at the small level and working up,
it seems clear that
the space of possible molecules is vaster than the number of atoms in the
universe. Once this is true, it is evident that the actual molecules in the bio-
sphere are a tiny fraction of the space of the possible. Almost certainly, then,
the molecules we see are to some extent the results of historical accidents in
this history of life.
Id. at 186. For example, many evolutionary biologists believe that "sex has
evolved... to permit genetic recombination. And recombination provides a kind of
approximation to a God's-eye view of... large-scale features of fitness landscapes."
Id. at 180.
72. For a more extensive analysis of the role of self-critical behavior and di-
ninishing returns in the sociolegal system generally, see Ruhl & Ruhl, Arrow of
Law, supra note 15, at 470-77.
73. Self-organized criticality is "[a] generic pattern of self-organized non-
equilibrium behavior in which there are characteristic long-range temporal and spa-
tial regularities." COVENEY & HIGHFIELD, supra note 8, at 432. Thus a complex
adaptive system "can be locally stressed to a critical state. When the critical thresh-
old is exceeded, the stress is distributed to the neighborhood around the locale. This
can, in turn, lead to further critical thresholds in the neighboring locations thereby
propagating the disturbance." Dale H. Lockwood & Jeffrey A. Lockwood, Evidence of
Self-Organized Criticality in Insect Populations, COMPLEXITY, Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 49,
49.
The classic example is provided by physicist Per Bak, who is credited as being
the founder of the hypothesis:
We are to picture a table. Above, rather like the hand of God outstretched
toward Adam's on the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel, a hand is poised, holding
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either by avoiding it in the first place-not a particularly
adaptive strategy-or by shedding it in small, frequent doses
when needed to avoid buildup of unmanageable stress levels.
Of course, earthquakes do happen. Even in the self-critical
state, a complex adaptive system will occasionally experience
major disruptions inherent in nonlinearity and aggregation.74
Change is constant, displayed in high frequencies of small fluc-
tuations, punctuated by the occasional large shifts in system
conditions. In other words, there is only a course of "punctuated
equilibrium" in which periods of equilibrium are simply periods
of incremental change surrounded by catastrophic events.7" In-
deed, the disturbances caused by the major change events are
necessary to maintain system diversity, as they disrupt the es-
tablished "equilibrium" and make room for new system compo-
nents and arrangements.76
Self-critical behavior is also a manifestation of the fact that
improvements in system fitness come with diminishing returns."
sand. Sand slips persistently from the hand onto the table, piling higher and
higher until the heap of sand slides in avalanches from the top of the table
onto a distant floor.
Piling higher, then reaching its rest angle, the sandpile achieves a
rough stationary state. As the sand is trickled onto the pile, many small
sandslides avalanche down the sides, and a few large sandslides ..... We
have noted before, if one plots these avalanches, one finds our new familiar
power-law distribution.
KAUFFMAN, AT HOME IN THE UNIVERSE, supra note 8, at 235-36. See generally Fred
Guterl, Riddles in the Sand, DISCOVER, Nov. 1996, at 104, 108-14 (describing cur-
rent research on Bak's theory and on the unexplained behavior of sand generally); I.
Peterson, Shaken Bead Beds Show Pimples and Dimples, 150 SCI. NEWS 135, 135
(1996) (describing new research method for studying granular flow). Bak has posited
how this principle might apply to earthquakes, clouds, solar flares, biological evolu-
tion, and economies, and posits that it is a necessary feature for integration of any
system component into a highly complex system. See generally BAK, supra note 32,
at 86-190; Per Bak, Self-Organized Criticality: A Holistic View of Nature, in
COMPLEXITY: METAPHORS, MODELS, AND REALITY at 477, 477-96 (George A. Cowan
et al. eds., 1994).
74. See KAUFFMAN, AT HOME IN THE UNIVERSE, supra note 8, at 236 (positing
that physical, biological, and perhaps even economic worlds may exhibit self-
organized criticality by considering the example that even the size distribution of
earth quakes is a composite of small quakes and a few large ones).
75. For a further discussion of punctuated equilibrium theory as it emerged in
paleontology, see Ruhl, Fitness of Law, supra note 15, at 1428-30. A variation of the
theory focuses on the "coordinated stasis" found in the paleontological records, of
which there is mounting evidence. See Does Evolutionary History Take Million-Year
Breaks?, 278 SCIENCE 576 (1997).
76. Today ecologists are confirming that large disturbances such as fires and
floods can promote ecosystem diversity. See Seth R. Reice, Nonequilibrium Determi.
nants of Biological Community Structure, 82 AM. SCIENTIST 424, 430 (1994). Thus,
human efforts to suppress those catastrophes have contributed to diminishing biodi-
versity over time. See id. at 424.
77. See KAUFFMAN, AT HOME IN THE UNIVERSE, supra note 8, at 236
HeinOnline  -- 34 Hous. L. Rev. 952 1997-1998
1997] COMPLEXITYAND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
As fitness increases, the effort required to improve fitness in ad-
ditional increments also increases.78 The drive toward higher fit-
ness thus becomes self-defeating after a point, and it makes
sense for the system to lop off some of the infrastructure it is
using in search of higher fitness in order to preserve energy
needed for responding to changing conditions. Therefore, the re-
ality of complex adaptive systems is that they are usually quite
average in performance over any short term horizon; their virtue
is in sustaining that level of performance over the long term." It
is entirely possible, indeed probable, that for any fixed environ-
ment the system design best suited for withstanding adverse
conditions-the maximally "fit" system-will be one which is ei-
ther highly ordered or highly chaotic-that is not a complex
adaptive system. The problem is that over time environmental
conditions change, and if the system designed for one set of con-
ditions cannot adapt to those changes, what were once the fittest
qualities may become liabilities."0 To borrow a phrase, by de-
signing the maximally fit system for the moment, you can wind
up winning the battle but losing the war.
B. Examples of Complex Adaptive Systems in the Subject Matter
of Environmental Law
At the time of the first major international conference on the
environment in Stockholm in 1972, there had been almost no
mention in scientific or legal literature of what are among the front-
runners of environmental policy focus today- global warming, acid
(indicating that every step taken toward higher fitness decreases the number of
paths leading toward still higher fitness).
78. This interrelation is an inherent feature of an adaptive walk across a cor-
related fitness landscape in that "with every step one takes uphill, the number of
directions leading higher is cut by a constant fraction .... so it becomes ever harder
to keep improving." Id. at 178. Kauffman explains that "[a) very simple law governs
such long-jump adaptation[s]. The result, exactly mimicking adaptive walks via fit-
ter single-mutant variants on random landscapes is this: every time one finds a fit-
ter long-jump variant, the expected number of tries to find a still better long-jump
variant doubles!" Id at 193. Thus, "[als this exponential slowing of the ease and rate
of finding distant fitter variants occurs, then it becomes easier to find fitter variants
on the local hills nearby." Id. at 195. The rule of thumb, therefore, is that "[als fit-
ness increases, search closer to home. On a correlated landscape, nearby positions
have similar fitnesses. Distant positions can have fitnesses very much higher and
very much lower. Thus optimal search distance is high when fitness is low and de-
creases as fitness increases." Id. at 196.
79. See id. at 224-35.
80. Thus, "[t]he self-organized critical state with all its fluctuations is not the
best possible state, but it is the best state that is dynamically achievable." BAK, su-
pra note 32, at 198.
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rain, and tropical deforestation.8 Did these problems arise sud-
denly? How did they escape our detection until recently? What
will the next problem be?
It is not clear that asking these questions, much less at-
tempting to answer them, is a useful exercise. Environmental
processes, including how the environment responds to human in-
sults, have a tremendous capacity to generate significant prob-
lems for society and to take us by surprise despite our intensive
efforts to study and predict them." To be sure, we perceive
abundant regularities in the environment-the sun rises in the
east, grass is green, seasons change-but even these we see as
constants only because changes in them occur over scales of time
that are not relevant to human perception. The rule of thumb for
the relevant scales of time and space, however, is one of continu-
ous, perceptible, unpredictable changes across many environ-
mental parameters. This is because environmental processes and
social influences on environmental processes are run by the rules
of complex adaptive systems. In other words, the subject matter
of environmental law and policy is a mess.
At the risk of appearing reductionist and thus omitting im-
portant dynamics, the previous point can be demonstrated by fo-
cusing on several of the important components of the human-
environment system: ecosystems, technology, economies, and
land use. Ecosystems represent a natural system, technology
represents a human-designed physical system, and economies
represent a human activity system.' Land use is the intersection
of all three-the use of technology directed by economic forces to
convert natural ecosystems to human uses. Each of these is a
complex adaptive system in its own right. Together, along with
many other social and natural phenomena, they form a set of co-
evolving systems that defy our complete understanding.
1. Ecosystems. Biological evolution is one of the most
studied topics in science, and yet the amount we do not know
about evolution far exceeds the amount we do know. The part we
do not even begin to understand is associated with the
81. See Norman Myers, Environmental Unknowns, 269 SCIENCE 358, 358
(1995).
82. See Michael P. Collier et al., Experimental Flooding in Grand Canyon, SCI.
AM., Jan. 1997, at 82, 82-83 (reporting how a planned flood had the surprising effect
of creating a beach).
83. See CLAYTON & RADCLIFFE, supra note 14, at 21 (grouping systems into
five categories: (1) natural systems; (2) designed physical systems; (3) designed ab-
stract systems; (4) human activity systems; and (5) transcendental systems). For
purposes of the analysis here, I do not consider the category of transcendental sys-
tems as it is beyond our knowledge. The category of human-designed abstract sys-
tems is represented, of course, by law itself.
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contribution ecological forces make to evolutionary dynamics. As
the eminent biologist Edward 0. Wilson puts it, "[wihat we
understand best about evolution is mostly genetic, and what we
understand least is mostly ecological.... [The major remaining
questions of evolutionary biology are ecological rather than
genetic in content."'
The emergence in environmental biology of the concept of
ecosystems as unpredictable, dynamically changing systems has
injected a heightened awareness of the role of indeterminacy and
randomness into evolutionary theory.? The mix of species in an eco-
system depends largely on the timing of introduction and the loca-
tion. 6 But how are the assembly rulese for an ecosystem determined,
84. EDWARD 0. WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE 93 (1992). See also Michael T.
Madigan & Barry L. Marrs, Extremophiles, SCI. ABI., Apr. 1997, at 82, 82 (reporting
the discovery of a new branch of life found in extreme ecological conditions); Richard
Monastersky, Out of Arid Africa: Debate Heats Up on Whether Climate Change
Sparks Evolutionary Outbursts, 150 Sci. NEWS 74, 74-75 (1996) (discussing whether
climate changes instigate evolutionary changes); Taylor, supra note 6, at 52 (noting
that "[alt present... the structure and dynamics of this ecological context have not
been well integrated into evolutionary theory').
85. As the geneticist John Holland has observed about ecosystems, "the whole
is more than the sum of its parts. Even when we have a catalog of the activities of
most of the participating species, we are far from understanding the effect of
changes in the ecosystem." HOLLAND, supra note 2, at 3. See also COHEN &
STEWART, supra note 8, at 367 (comparing an ecosystem to a river that constantly
changes because one never steps in the same water twice). The past 30 years of re-
search in biology have spawned a "new paradigm of ecology, mothballing the old no-
tion of a 'balance of nature' and unveiling a vibrant new replacement focusing on
flux." William Stolzenburg, Building a Better Refuge, NATURE CONSERVANCY, Jan.-
Feb. 1996, at 18, 21. The new focus on dynamic change has led scientists to reevalu-
ate the premises upon which many legal and policy decisions have been based, such
as the size, location, and operation of wildlife refuges. See id.
86. For example, in the phenomenon known as adaptive radiation, ecosystem
conditions determined the variety of finch species on the Galapagos Islands and the
cichlids of Lake Victoria. See WEINER, supra note 6, at 207-08; WILSON, supra note
84, at 106-08. In these cases, one or very few ancestral species that originally colo-
nized the habitat have since then radiated into many species that now fill almost all
the usual niches of birds, in the case of the Galapagos finches, or freshwater fish, in
the case of the cichlids. See WILSON, supra note 84, at 101-04, 107 (discussing how
the various niches were filled by the Galapagos finches and how the cichlids fill al-
most all niches available to freshwater fish). Had those niches already been filled by
other species, evolution would have taken a different course. See id. at 96 (observing
that when a few species split and massively respond to an opportunity, they and
their descendants seize a large portion of the environment and hold it thereafter).
Similarly, convergence is "the increasing similarity during evolution of two or more
unrelated species." Id. at 395. For example, in ecosystems around the world that
lack true woodpeckers, such as some recently (in geological time) formed islands,
adaptive radiations of the bird species which originally colonized the ecosystems
have led to evolutionary convergence of different new species towards the wood-
pecker niche. See id. at 98-101.
87. Wilson explains that "[aissembly rules determine which species can coexist
in a community of organisms (such as the bird species occupying a forest patch). The
rules also determine the sequence in which species are able to colonize the habitat."
WILSON, supra note 84, at 171. Some complex adaptive systems researchers are de-
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and how do they contribute to evolution of species across time?
These are the questions of the future for evolutionary biologists.
Questions about ecosystems not only are relevant to evolu-
tionary biologists, but also go to the heart of environmental law
and policy at all levels. Here again, we find that we know less
than we do not know, but we do know the following:
1. The connections between species within an ecosystem
are often poorly understood,' or understood too late to do
any good.
2. Little is known, particularly for large carnivores, about
how much habitat and how many species individuals are
needed to support a species as a long-term viable popula-
tion.9'
3. One of the most pernicious and least understood threats
to ecosystems involves the "invasion," often unwittingly as-
sisted by human activities, by particularly adaptable spe-
cies that prey upon or out-compete the "native" species of
the ecosystem.
voting considerable effort to investigating the complex factors that lead to discrete
assemblages of co-adapted species. See Works in Progress: Ecological Discontinui-
ties, SFI BULLETIN, Summer 1997, at 13, 13.
88. The extinct dodo, for example, is now believed to have had a mutualistic
relationship with the endangered tambalacoque tree: the tree's seed evolved to resist
crushing in a dodo's gizzard, resulting in a pit too thick to germinate without abra-
sion of its outer wall. See Sally Valdes-Cogliano, A Lost Piece of the Puzzle, EN.
DANGERED SPECIES BULL., Nov.-Dec. 1996, at 11, 11. But, while passing through the
birds' system, the seeds underwent sufficient abrasion to promote germination once
expelled from the bird. See id. The dodo's extinction over 300 years ago only recently
was identified as a major cause of the tree's decline. See id. Now that the connection
is understood, the tree's seed can be germinated artificially. See id.
89. For instance, researchers have determined that the life cycle of most native
freshwater mussel species in American rivers includes a brief stage as a benign
parasite on specific host species of fish who help disperse the mussels upstream. See
Richard J. Neves, The Mussel/Fish Connection, ENDANGERED SPECIES BULL., Nov.-
Dec. 1996, at 12, 12. Little is known, however, about which mussel species are
paired with which fish species, and as freshwater fish diversity in aquatic ecosys-
tems declines, researchers are finding it difficult to predict which species of mussels
also will decline. See id. at 13.
90. For example, a single wolverine may travel 60 miles in one day; a Rocky
Mountain wolf pack uses about 500 square miles as its home base; and a population
of 1,000 grizzly bears might require an area 20 times larger than Yellowstone Na-
tional Park. See William Stolzenburg, The Jaguar's Umbrella, NATURE CON-
SERVANCY, Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 8, 9.
91. For example, the zebra mussel, which entered North American waters in
the ballast of ships, has disrupted the algae and nutrient components of many eco-
systems on its way to becoming a dominant mollusk species. See Peter M. Vitousek
et al., Biological Invasions as Global Environmental Change, 84 AM. SCIENTIST 468,
468 (1996). Additionally, the introduction of brook and rainbow trout and other sport
fish in many aquatic ecosystems has reduced native invertebrate and amphibian
populations. See id. at 472. Likewise, in a classic positive feedback loop, the intro-
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4. Evidence of more direct adverse effects of human activi-
ties on ecosystems is abundant but difficult to understand
in terms of causal effect, source of the problem, and possi-
ble solution.'
5. It cannot be assumed that human influence always pre-
sents a negative for ecosystem dynamics. '
6. Human efforts to conserve species may sometimes actu-
ally do more damage to ecosystems than good.'
duction of African and Asian grasses that promote and resist fire has increased the
intensity and frequency of fires and completely transformed the vegetative mix in
many Australian and American grasslands. See id. at 474-75. Many such invasions
are brought about as unintended consequences of human efforts to control pests with
introduced predators. See, e.g., S.M. Louda, Ecological Effects of an Insect Intro-
duced for the Biological Control of Weeds, 277 SCIENCE 1088, 1088 (1997); Biological
Noncontrol, Sci. AM., Nov. 1997, at 36, 36. There is some evidence that invasion oc-
curs without human intervention simply as a result of the diversity of ecosystems
that makes them attractive to "outsiders." See Jocelyn Kaiser & Richard Gallagher,
How Humans and Nature Influence Ecosystems: Does Diversity Lure Invaders?, 277
SCIENCE 1204, 1204 (1997).
92. For example, recently a cyberspace conference was held in which research-
ers exchanged papers and hypotheses, with no clear consensus, regarding the in-
crease in amphibian deformities that has been experienced around the world. See
Sasha Nemecek, Amphibians On-line, SCI AM., Mar. 1997, at 18, 18. Possible expla-
nations offered included parasitic flatworms, water pollution, and increased ultra-
violet radiation. See id. See generally William Stolzenburg, The Naked Frog,
NATURE CONSERVANCY, Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 24 (tracking the status of the Ramsey
Canyon leopard frog); Study by NIEHS Says Frog Deformities Could Be Linked To
Water Pollution, 28 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1038, 1038 (1997). The United States Geologi-
cal Survey has launched a North American Reporting Center for Amphibian Mal-
formations to track hot spots of this phenomenon. See Seen Any Deformed Frogs?,
152 SCI. NEWS 31, 31 (1997).
93. Ohio's largest single bat colony lives in an abandoned mine. See Bruce A.
Stein & Stephanie R. Flack, Conservation Priorities: The State of U.S. Plants and
Animals, ENVIRONAENT, May 1997, at 6, 37. Further, I know from personal observa-
tion that millions of bats live under a bridge in Austin, Texas. Species sometimes
thrive in ongoing human disturbance regimes. For example, in an effort to reduce
common leaf rust, Latin American coffee plantation owners began switching in the
1970s from shade to full sun growing techniques. See T. Adler, Coffee Can Give
Many Species a Boost, 150 SC. NEWS 132, 132 (1996). Biologists now are finding
that the thick underbrush and dense canopies of shade plantations provided species-
rich islands of habitat in otherwise deforested areas, whereas the new sun method
plantations are virtually devoid of birds and small mammals. See id. In other words,
even though one type of human disturbance adversely affected the environment,
species thrived amidst another type of disturbance. Similarly, studies of the Colo-
rado River below the Glen Canyon Dam show that the damming and flow control
promoted populations of trout in the cold water below the dam and allowed trees and
shrubs to establish along the shoreline, providing habitat to several endangered
birds. See Collier et al., supra note 82, at 82, 83. The decision to adjust the flow to
more closely approximate the pre-dam conditions necessarily sacrificed those ecosys-
tem states for another set. See id. at 83 (observing that although the dam brought
about some beneficial changes, it also dramatically altered the area's vegatation.
94. For example, efforts to restore duck and goose habitats in the United
States have resulted in a snow goose population explosion that threatens the snow
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These sources of uncertainty make societal decisions all the
more difficult, as we are unsure what effects our behavior will
have on the environment.95 A growing effort to explain these
properties through complexity theory and the depiction of eco-
systems as complex adaptive systems promises to improve our
understanding of their origins and inevitability."
2. Technology. Although it may seem that the cart led to
the carriage, which led to the prototype automobile, which led to
the station wagon, which led to today's sport utility vehicle,
technological advancement is much more of a nonlinear process."
As James Burke concludes in his epic study of the technological
developments that have shaped modern society,98 technology is
often portrayed in reductionist terms as progressing through
discrete time and theme phases and through the efforts of
individual "inventors," but this is seldom the case.99 In reality,
goose habitat as well as the habitat of other species, some already endangered, that
nest in the same arctic region. See United States Fish and Wildlife Service, United
States Department of Interior, News Release, Report Warns that Snow Goose Popu-
lation Explosion Threatens Arctic Ecosystems (April 1, 1997) <www.fws.gov>.
95. Indeed, "[tihe degree of uncertainty is high at small scales... and is mag-
nified as scale approaches the landscape level." David N. Wear et al., Ecosystem
Management With Multiple Owners: Landscape Dynamics in a Southern Appala-
chian Watershed, 6 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 1173, 1174 (1996).
96. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 1, at 420; R.F. Costantino et al., Chaotic Dy-
namics in an Insect Population, 275 SCIENCE 389, 389-91 (1997) (discussing chaotic
behavior of flour beetles); Robert Costanza et al., Modeling Complex Ecological Eco-
nomic Systems, 43 BIOSCIENCE 545, 545 (1993) (noting new ways for modeling inter-
actions between anthropogenic and natural systems); Alan Hastings & Kevin Hig-
gins, Persistence of Transients in Spatially Structured Ecological Models, 263
SCIENCE 1133, 1133 (1994) (opining that because there are typically sudden changes
in the form of a species's dynamics over the thousands of years it may take a species
to reach its final dynamics, complex transient dynamics in ecological models may be
more relevant than long-term behavior); Simon A. Levin et al., Mathematical and
Computational Challenges in Population Biology and Ecosystems Science, 275
SCIENCE 334, 334 (1997) (stating that "[miathematical and computational ap-
proaches to biological questions... are now recognized as providing some of the
most powerful tools in learning about nature"); Douglas S. Robertson & Michael C.
Grant, Feedback and Chaos in Darwinian Evolution, COMPLEXITY, Nov.-Dec. 1996,
at 18 (applying chaos theory to develop a numerical model depicting Darwinian
natural selection); Karl Sigmund, Darwin's "Circles of Complexity": Assembling Eco-
logical Communities, COMPLEXITY, Jan. 1995, at 40 (applying complexity theories to
analyze the stability of ecosystems).
97. For a more extensive discussion of this property of technology change and
its analogical values for the legal system, see Ruhl & Ruhl, Arrow of Law, supra note
15, at 444-52.
98. See generally JAMES BURKE, CONNECTIONS (1978). Burke's wonderfully
written book carries the reader through the decidedly nonlinear development and
cultural impacts of a rich variety of technologies, including clocks, looms, buttons,
money, and the zoopraxiscope.
99. See id. at 288 (observing that the characterization of an individual as solo
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the triggering factor in technological advancement "is more often
than not operating in an area entirely unconnected with the
situation which is about to undergo change.""' Thus, a linear
view of technological change misses many of the major points
and distorts what it does reveal. 1 ' Despite the prevailing linear
conception, the reality is that throughout history, and no doubt
for the future as well, the major events of technological
advancement are the result of "a fascinating mixture of accident,
climactic change, genius, craftsmanship, careful observation,
ambition, greed, war, religious belief, deceit, and a hundred
other factors.""2
The reductionist, linear view of technological advancement
influences society profoundly, in what Edward Tenner calls the
"perils of technological extrapolation." 3 We tend to overlook the
nonlinear reality of technological advancement that defies ex-
trapolation of perceived trends, and we make mistakes as a re-
sult."' Society's response to problems associated with technology
is usually to employ yet more technology, because that is what
society knows best how to do, and that is what was done be-
fore. '5 In other words, technological advancement breeds yet
creator exaggerates his influence and denies the involvement of others whose work
was necessary to the invention). Burke's detailed history of events shaping techno-
logical change shows that the periodic, thematic, and heroic treatments tend to ig-
nore the overlapping nature of so-called periods, imply a degree of foreknowledge
where none exists, and exaggerate the influence of individuals over events.
100. Id. at 289. See also James Burke, The Silk Road, SC. AM., Nov. 1995, at
109, 109 (declaring that "[rieductionism simply does not begin to describe this com-
plex, serendipitous process [of technology innovation], in which even apparently
trivial elements have the most important effects").
101. For example, Burke points out that
[a] linear view of the past would, for instance, place the arrival of the chim-
ney in a sequence of developments relating to change in domestic living. Yet
the alteration of life-style brought about by the chimney included year-round
administration and increased intellectual activity, which in turn contributed
to a general increase in the economic welfare of the community to a point
where the increase in the construction of houses brought about a shortage of
wood. The consequent need for alternative sources of energy spurred the de-
velopment of a furnace which would operate efficiently on coal, and this led
to the production of molten iron in large quantities, permitting the casting of
the cylinders which were used in the early steam engines.
BURKE, supra note 98, at 289.
102. Id. at 13; see also Michael Shermer, The Crooked Timber of History,
COMfPLEXlTY, July-Aug. 1997, at 23, 24-26 (discussing complexity theory applications
to the study of history).
103. EDWARD TENNER, WHY THINGS BITE BACK at x (1996).
104. See i&L at 254-77 (giving examples of how technological advancements and
improvements have lead to discontent).
105. As Burke puts it:
[Miost of us take the only available course: we ignore the vulnerability of our
position, since we have no choice but to do so. We seek security in the rou-
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more technological advancement, in what Tenner calls the
"intensiveness effect," through which problems such as environ-
mental degradation are addressed by intensifying the technologi-
cal apparatus."6 This reality of technological change has deep
implications for environmental policy:
1. Many technological innovations affecting the environ-
ment for good or bad are the result of serendipity rather
than concerted effort."0 7
2. Many efforts to bring about technologic change on be-
half of the environment fail to do so as expected or within
the time frame that was considered feasible."'8
3. The full environmental effects of technological change
are difficult to measure and may take many years to fully
manifest themselves."9
tines imposed by the technological systems which structure our lives into
periods of work and rest. In spite of the fact that any breakdown in our in-
terdependent world will spread like ripples in a pool, we do not believe that
the breakdown will occur. Even when it does,.. . our first reaction is to pre-
sume that the fault will be rectified, and that technology will, as it always
has, come to the rescue.
BURKE, supra note 98, at 6.
106. See TENNER, supra note 103, at 270-77.
107. For example, the discovery of "extremophile" organisms living near deep
ocean vents and surviving on a toxic brew of chemicals released from the vents may
lead to innovative waste remediation biotechnologies. See Richard Monastersky,
Deep Dwellers: Microbes Thrive Far Below Ground, 151 Sci. NEWS 192, 193 (1997)
(stating that subsurface microbes can provide industry with a method for cleaning
wastewater because they can consume toxic chemicals and thrive in industrial
wastewater).
108. For example, the development of "zero-emission vehicles" is moving slowly,
and some concerns have been raised that initial electric car prototypes could pose a
net negative effect for the environment in certain countries. See Camilla Kazimi,
Evaluating the Environmental Impact of Alternative-Fuel Vehicles, 33 J. ENVTL.
ECON. & MGMT. 163, 164-65 (1997) (positing that use of limited range electrical ve-
hicles in multi-car families could lead to greater emissions); Eliot Marshall, Slower
Road for Clean-Car Program, 276 SCIENCE 194, 194 (1997); Technologies for Next-
Generation Car Should Not be Pared Too Soon, Report Says, 27 Env't Rep. (BNA)
2490, 2490 (1997). But see Daniel Sperling, The Case for Electric Vehicles, SCI. AM.,
Nov. 1996, at 54 (discussing advantages of electric vehicles).
109. For example, the persistence of acid rain after a decade of technological im-
provements that succeeded in substantially reducing industrial sulfur dioxide emis-
sions has led researchers to conclude that other phenomena, such as reductions in
atmospheric dust brought about by improved farming techniques, contribute to acid
rain in previously unanticipated ways. Oddly, the efforts to reduce air emissions
from one set of sources have offset the efforts to reduce different emissions from
other sources. See Lars 0. Hedin & Gene E. Likens, Atmospheric Dust and Acid
Rain, SCI. AM., Dec. 1996, at 85, 86 (noting that the bases in the dust neutralize the
acids in industrial emissions, but as dust emissions are reduced, that effect also was
reduced).
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4. In highly technological societies, small failures in tech-
nology can spread rapidly and virulently through the
technological infrastructure."0
Complexity theory researchers such as Stuart Kauffman
have begun to describe these properties of technological change
using the core concepts of complexity theory, given their close fit
with the properties of complex adaptive systems.' For example,
Kauffman points to the presence of fitness jumps followed by de-
creasing returns that can be found in the historical record of new
technologies." The implications of this emerging view of tech-
nology as a complex adaptive system lead inevitably to consid-
eration of how environmental law and policy respond to techno-
logical change and failure.
110. A frightening example, though not related to environmental policy, is the
so-called Year 2000 computer problem, in which computer software used to run
many mainframes and PCs reads years ending in 00 as the year 1900. See IVARS
PETERSON, FATAL DEFECT 114-15 (1995) (discussing the Year 2000 problem). The
problems caused by that rather trivial programming defect will require massive ex-
penditures to correct before the year 2000. See ida at 118 (stating that averting the
possible Year 2000 disaster will require considerable effort). Estimates are that it
will cost New York City over $100 million to fix this "glitch" and the United States
government $2.3 billion to $5.6 billion. See James Kim, One.Man Army Fights His
City's Year 2000 Hitch, USA TODAY, Apr. 29, 1997, at B1. Even small towns face ex-
penditures over $100,000. See id (stating that North Platte, a small Nebraska town
with a population of 24,500, will have to pay $150,000 to hire programmers to han-
dle the Year 2000 problem). Naturally, lawyers have noticed the problem and its po-
tential litigation consequences. See Jon Newberry, Beat the Clock, A.B.-A J., June
1997, at 49, 50 (predicting numerous lawsuits brought by and against victims of the
"millennium bug").
111. Kauffman, whose work adapting complexity theory to evolutionary biology
has been highly influential, posits:
Both organisms and artifacts confront conflicting design constraints. As
shown, it is those constraints that create rugged fitness landscapes. Evolu-
tion explores its landscapes without the benefit of intention. We explore the
landscapes of technological opportunity with intention, under the selective
pressure of market forces. But if the underlying design problems result in
similar rugged landscapes of conflicting constraints, it would not be aston-
ishing if the same laws governed both biological and technological evolution.
KAUFFMAN, AT HOME IN THE UNIVERSE, supra note 8, at 192. See also Larry J.
Eriksson, How Technology Evolves, COMPLEXITY, Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 23, 23
(describing how technological innovation results from the development of a new
technology combined with new performance requirements for old technology).
112. Kauffman explains that
[diuring the initial phase of rapid improvements, investment in the new
technology yields rapid improvement in performance. This can yield what
economists call increasing returns, which attract investment and drive fur-
ther innovation. Later, when learning slows, little improvement occurs per
investment dollar, and the mature technology is in a period of what econo-
mists call diminishing returns. Attracting capital for further innovation be-
comes more difficult. Growth of that technology sector slows, markets satu-
rate, and further growth awaits a burst of fundamental innovation in some
other sector.
KAUFFMAN, AT HOME IN THE UNIVERSE, supra note 8, at 203.
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3. Economies. Is there any rational explanation for why
thousands of parents combed through toy stores in 1996 looking
for "Tickle Me Elmo" dolls for which they were willing to pay
exorbitant premiums?... Why were the parents, the toy stores,
and the doll manufacturer unable to predict the demand for that
doll? The answer to the first question is no. The answer to the
second question is that no one can accurately predict consumer
demand in all cases. Consumers and firms, once you amass
enough of them, often act collectively in seemingly irrational,
unpredictable, evolving ways-in other words, as a complex
adaptive system. This quality has not gone unnoticed in
complexity theory research, as one of the first branchings of the
field into the social sciences involved economic theory and the
study of consumer and market behavior."'
Consumption presents a thorny problem for environmental
policy. Even before the environmental revolution of the 1970s,
environmentalists such as Paul Ehrlich argued that the total
burden humans place on the environment is a function of three
variables: population, affluence, and technology."' We have seen
the importance of technology to environmental policy;.. popula-
tion and affluence combine to account for the consumption fac-
tor.11 7 Indeed, one of the raging debates of environmental policy
is where to focus the effort: on population control, consumption
restraints, or technological innovation."' Where technological
113. See The Holiday Trends That Stole Christmas, NY TIMES, Dec. 22, 1996, at
A43 (describing Tickle Me Elmo dolls as "sending parents into near-hysterics trying
to find one").
114. See, e.g., W. BRIAN ARTHUR, INCREASING RETURNS AND PATH DEPENDENCE
IN THE ECONOMY (1994); PAUL KRUGMAN, THE SELF-ORGANIZING ECONOMY 2 (1996)
(applying common principles of complexity to economic analysis); Costanza et al.,
supra note 96, at 545 (observing that both ecological and economic systems exhibit
characteristics of complex systems).
115. See PAUL R. EHRLICH, THE POPULATION BOMB 1-44 (1968). Ehrlich's
"equation" is largely a modern variation on Malthus's theory of population growth
outstripping food supply growth. See THOMAS R. MALTHUS, AN ESSAY ON THE
PRINCIPLE OF POPULATION 11-38 (MacMillan & Co. Ltd. 1966) (1798) (predicting
checks on population growth due to inability of food and nutrition to support such
growth); see also Stuart L. Hart, Beyond Greening: Strategies for a Sustainable
World, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 66, 70 (providing a recent look at the
Ehrlich formula).
116. Refer to Part II.B.2 supra and accompanying text.
117. See Hart, supra note 115, at 70.
118. See id. at 70-71. Two "camps" have formed around this question, with dia-
metrically opposed answers. Ehrlich leads the camp contending that consumption
must be drastically controlled. See EHRLICH, supra note 115, at 48-49 (predicting
that as the food crisis intensifies the rate of soil deterioration will increase). The
economist Julian Simon leads the camp contending that technological change will
prevent rising consumption from depleting and destroying natural resources. See
Julian L. Simon, Resources, Population, Environment: An Oversupply of False Bad
News, 208 SCIENCE 1431, 1436 (1980) (stating that the key constraint upon the lim-
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change causes environmental problems or is unresponsive to ex-
isting problems, consumption is a necessary focus of environ-
mental policy."' But just as technological change exhibits com-
plex adaptive system behavior that befuddles environmental
policy, so too will consumption:
1. Controlling growth in global consumption will be diffi-
cult as developing countries understandably aspire to
higher standards of living for their large populations.'
2. Deeply embedded consumption patterns are difficult to
change even when the environmental goals are well under-
stood and widely accepted.2'
3. Because the environmental effects of consumption are of-
ten far removed from the locus of consumption, consumers
its of natural resources is the limit upon knowledge and technological innovation).
Additionally, a hybrid view appears to be emerging in which rational policy re-
sponses are called for with respect to both consumption and technology. See Jesse H.
Ausubel, Can Technology Spare the Earth?, 84 AM. SCIENTIST 166, 177 (1996)
(arguing that technology enables people to obtain goods and services more efficiently
and that technology used wisely "can spare the earth").
119. See Jonathan Harris, Consumption and the Environment: Overview Essay,
in THE CONSrMER SOCIETY 269-76 (Neva Goodwin et al. eds., 1997) (reviewing the
issues surrounding consumption and its effects on the environment); Norman Myers,
Consumption in Relation to Population, Environment and Development, 17 EN.
VIRONMENTALIST 33, 34-37 (1997); Arnold W. Reitze Jr., Population, Consumption,
and Environmental Law, 12 NAT. RESOURCES & ENVr - (forthcoming) (draft on file
with the Houston Law Review).
120. China, for example, has over one billion people, only one million cars, and
one of the world's fastest growing economies. See Hart, supra note 115, at 75. Even a
heavy dose of population and affluence controls designed to suppress China's con-
sumption of cars will not avoid the reality that tens of millions of hydrocarbon-
burning cars are going to be headed to China in the next decade, which suggests that
a concerted international effort to develop pollution control technology for cars is
warranted. See id. Although most fingers point at the United States for its high rate
of consumption per capita, the inevitable marginal increases in consumption by huge
numbers of poor people present a far more intractable problem for the future of envi-
ronmental policy. See Myers, supra note 119, at 34; see also Vaclav Smil, China
Shoulders the Cost of Environmental Change, ENVIRONMENT, July-Aug. 1997, at 6,
7-9, 33-36 (documenting the environmental costs of China's rapidly expanding econ-
omy).
121. Consider, for example, the effort under the Clean Air Act to require em-
ployers in certain cities to enforce car pooling among their employees. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 7408(f)(1)(A) (1994) (addressing pollution control measures); see also id. § 7511a
(c)(5)(A) (discussing transportation control measures). The persons responsible for
that idea obviously had never lived and worked in Houston, where land use and em-
ployment patterns make the "consumption" of driving alone practically mandatory.
See Caleb Solomon, Head-On Collision: Cut Auto Commuting? Firms and Employees
Gag at Clean-Air Plan, WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 1994, at Al (stating that Houston resi-
dents will continue to drive because of the lack of a mass transit system and the fact
that subtropical weather and long commutes make walking and biking impractica-
ble).
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often fail to make connections between their behavior and
its environmental consequences.1
22
The list can go on. The sad reality is that "[in their roles as
consumers and producers, members of the social classes most fa-
voring increased environmental protection have lifestyles inti-
mately associated with massive waste-generating activities in-
cluding, for example, the serious environmental problems
associated with solid waste, automobiles, and the advances in
technology. " " For this reason, solving the consumption problem
will be like herding cats.
4. Land Use. Land use, in particular the conversion of land
from undisturbed natural states to agricultural and urban uses,
has a profound impact not only on the land under development,
but also on the surrounding ecosystems. 124 Unfortunately, we
have absolutely no idea how to design land use policies around
this ecological reality."5 Even if we could get a handle on
ecosystem dynamics, two decades of experience under legal
frameworks for active growth management leave us with much
remaining to be understood about the dynamics of land use and
122. For instance, despite nonstop bombardment with save-the-rainforest rheto-
ric, consumers are willing to pay premiums for tropical hardwood products. See
Richard E. Rice et al., Can Sustainable Management Save Tropical Forests?, SCI.
AM., Apr. 1997, at 44, 47 (noting that while valuable species such as Mahogany are
up to five times more profitable than a more sustainable alternative, consumers are
only willing to pay 10% more for the alternative). Additionally, the live reef food fish
trade, valued at more than $1 billion a year in Hong Kong and China, has tremen-
dously adverse effects on the far away reefs from where the fish are taken by anes-
thetizing squirts of cyanide. See Rita Ariyoshi, Halting a Coral Catastrophe, NATURE
CONSERVANCY, Jan.-Feb. 1977, at 20. Likewise, fishing for groundfish off the New
England coast with deep seabed "rock hopper" gear destroys the structurally com-
plex rock bottom of the seabed that provides the best shelter for the next generation
of groundfish. See Janet Raloff, Fishing for Answers: Deep trawls leave destruction
in their wake-but for how long?, 150 SCI. NEws. 268, 268 (1996). The distance effect
is caused in part by geographical separation. For example, the service industries
generate enormous indirect environmental effects felt at distant points in the econ-
omy, such as by virtue of their product selection decisions. See Brad Allenby, Clue-
less, ENVTL. F., Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 35, 35-37; David Rejeski, An Incomplete Picture,
ENVTL. F., Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 26, 26-34.
123. PETER CLEARY YEAGER, THE LIMITS OF LAW 307 (1991). See also Arnold W.
Reitze, Jr., Federalism and the Inspection and Maintenance Program Under the
Clean Air Act, 27 PAC. L.J. 1461, 1474 (1996) (observing that "Americans are not ea-
ger to sacrifice to protect the environment. They want both a clean, safe environ-
ment and the freedom to behave in a manner that makes protecting such an envi-
ronment very difficult").
124. See Peter Vitousek et al., Human Domination of Earth's Ecosystems, 277
SCI. 494, 494 (1997) (explaining how "[tihe use of land to yield goods and services
represents the most substantial human alteration of the Earth system").
125. See id. at 495 (stating that "[u]nderstanding land transformation is a diffi-
cult challenge; it requires integrating the social, economic, and cultural causes of
land transformation with evaluations of its biophysical nature and consequenced').
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land markets at the so-called urban fringe, their effects on
ecosystems, and which policy approaches work."" Difficulties
faced when attempting to manage land use with ecological goals
include the following:
1. Neither land use nor ecological biodiversity are uniform
in appearance or concentration, leading to potential colli-
sions of large scales. 7
126. As one commentator has observed, "[managing growth so as to mitigate its
impacts on natural resource systems is a major challenge due to the complex behav-
ior of these systems, the diverse intergovernmental programs for environmental pro-
tection, and the fragmented state of knowledge about linkages between growth and
natural resources." John S. Banta, Environmental Protection and Growth Manage-
ment, in UNDERSTANDING GROWTH MANAGEMENT 134, 134 (David J. Brower et al.
eds., 1989). See also Elizabeth Deakin, Growth Controls and Growth Management: A
Summary and Review of Empirical Research, in UNDERSTANDING GRov%,rH
MANAGEMENT 12 (David J. Brower et al. eds., 1989) (stating that "broader questions
of effectiveness, such as whether the programs are working as intended, are scoped
appropriately, and have reasonable benefit-cost ratios, remain largely unad-
dressed"); James H. Brown et al., Land Markets at the Urban Fringe: New Insights
for Policy Makers, 47 J. AM. PLAN. ASS'N 131, 131 (1981) (observing that "relatively
little is known about who owns rural land at the periphery of growing metropolitan
areas and how these landowners behave"); John D. Landis, Do Growth Controls
Work?: A New Assessment, 58 J. AM. PLAN. ASS'N 489, 503 (1992) (noting that
"Imlany questions about the efficacy of local growth controls still remain to be an-
swered").
127. One study estimates that over 90% of the species listed under the Endan-
gered Species Act as endangered or threatened have some or all of their habitat on
nonfederal lands. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE PUB. NO. GAO/RCED-95-16,
SPECIES PROTECTION ON NONFEDERAL LANDS 4 (1994). Of those species on the list,
73% have over 60% of their habitat on nonfederal lands, and 37% are completely de-
pendent on nonfederal lands. See id. at 5. Another study demonstrates that a mere
7% of the land area of the United States is home to fully 50c of plant and animal
species listed under the Endangered Species Act, and that the "hot spots," within
which many different at-risk species appear in clusters, are often located near areas
experiencing suburban expansion. See T. Adler, Mapping Out Endangered Species'
Hot Spots, 150 SCI. NEWS 101, 101 (1996) (describing how 50% of the listed endan-
gered species in the United States exist on only 7% of the land area presents prob-
lems for managing that small amount of land); A.P. Dobson et al., Geographic Dis-
tribution of Endangered Species in the United States, 275 SCIENCE 550, 551 (1997)
(explaining how the amount of land that needs to be managed to protect currently
endangered and threatened species in the United States is a relatively small propor-
tion of the land mass); Jon Paul Rodriguez et al., Where are Endangered Species
Found in the United States?, ENDANGERED SPECIES UPDATE, Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 1,
3-4 (explaining how more than 90% of the listed endangered species in the United
States are found in Hawaii, California, Florida, Texas, and southwestern Appalachia
and more than 95% of those are on private lands). Hence, although the built-up land
area is not a large proportion of the total national land area, it so happens that fur-
ther expansion of the built-up area poses a serious threat to many endangered spe-
cies and sensitive ecosystems. See William Stolzenberg, Habitat Is Where It's At,
NATURE CONSERVANCY, Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 6, 6 (discussing a recent study that iden-
tifies, based on federal agency records, habitat loss as the most frequently cited rea-
son for endangerment of species).
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2. Many of the most difficult problems in environmental
policy are associated with complex agricultural and urban
land use patterns."2 8
3. The impact of urban and suburban development in-
creasingly can be felt far outside the development fringe as
inhabitants import resources from outlying areas and ex-
port pollution in return."
4. Most ecologists are now convinced that preserving eco-
system integrity-that is, the mix of biota and physical
traits that underlie the complex adaptive system qualities
of ecosystems-requires preserving many large, contigu-
ous, undisturbed tracts of land ."
128. For example, federal regulation of air and water pollution in the 1970s and
the 1980s focused on so-called "end-of-the-pipe" controls on stationary, discrete
"point sources," largely because such sources were easier to control, both politicall'
and administratively. Today, however, nonpoint source water pollution, which in-
cludes diffuse runoff from streets, farms, mines, and other areas, accounts for a sub-
stantial amount of the contamination in polluted rivers and impaired lakes. See
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, NATIONAL WATER QUALITY INVENTORY:
1994 REPORT TO CONGRESS 403 (1995) (providing background on the problem of
nonpoint source pollution). Controlling the diffuse and numerous sources of nonpoint
source water pollution has proven difficult at both the federal and state levels. See
David Zaring, Federal Legislative Solutions to Agricultural Nonpoint Source Pollu-
tion, 26 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10128, 10128-32 (1996) (relating that non-
point sources are responsible for 65 to 75% of the nation's pollution and that non-
point sources are the predominant causes of pollution in 42 states).
129. See P. A. Matson et al., Agricultural Intensification and Ecosystem Proper-
ties, 277 SCIENCE 504, 507 (1997) (noting that "[allthough agroecosystems are typi-
cally managed in isolation from other ecosystems within a region, the physical, eco-
logical, and biogeochemical changes that take place within them have numerous
consequences for adjacent, and even distant, ecosystems"); Vitousek et al.., supra
note 124, at 495 (explaining how "the effects of land transformation extend far be-
yond the boundaries of transformed lands"). For example, the vast majority of Ne-
vada's 1.4 million residents live in two metropolitan areas covering less than 1% of
the state's land area. An additional 3% of the state is devoted to agricultural uses.
That 4% of total land cover, however, draws massive amounts of water from the
Colorado River, thus making its presence felt at considerable distances. See Paul R.
Ehrlich & Anne H. Ehrlich, Biodiversity and the Brownlash, DEFENDERS, Fall 1996,
at 6, 8. For a comprehensive discussion of the direct and indirect effects of human
populations on the environment, many of which are felt far beyond the built up
boundary of human occupation, see ANDREW GOUDIE, THE HUMAN IMPACT ON THE
NATURAL ENVIRONMENT 1-28 (4th ed. 1993) (reviewing the history and evolution of
mankind and its effect on the environment).
130. A focal point of conservation biology research has been to demonstrate the
often pernicious effects of habitat fragmentation. It appears to be indisputable, for
example, that a circular preserve of 1000 contiguous acres offers more ecological
value to many species than would 10 unconnected preserves of 100 acres each.
Smaller preserve structures increase the total linear "edge" of preserve boundaries,
which can present opportunities to predators, and many species have been demon-
strated to depend on a minimum "patch size" of habitat in order to carry out essen-
tial breeding, feeding, and sheltering functions. See Denis A. Saunders et al., Bio-
logical Consequences of Ecosystem Fragmentation: A Review, CONSERVATION
BIOLOGY, Mar. 1991, at 18, 24-25 (noting that the larger the "remnant," the more
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In other words, while land use policies must take into ac-
count ecosystem dynamics, development in the urban-suburban-
exurban-rural phase transition zones is unpredictable and slip-
pery, like a complex adaptive system. Thus, it does not lend itself
well to policies based on reductionist generalizations and linear
extrapolations.131
IlI. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ACTS AS IF ITS SUBJECT MATTER IS
REDUCIBLE, LINEAR, AND PREDICTABLE
Although all fields of law regulate human behavior, envi-
ronmental law is different. Environmental law regulates human be-
havior toward the environment. This quality presents a two-fold
challenge for environmental law, for both the target of environmental
likely it is that populations will be large, and, consequently, there %ill tend to be
higher levels of heterozygosity). The edge effect is not all bad in all cases, however,
as the increased interplay of species in that zone may lead to increased speciation as
a force of adaptation. See Martin Enserink, Life on the Edge: Rainforest Margins
May Spawn Species, 276 SCIENCE 1791, 1791 (1997) (observing that many new spe-
cies arise not in the rainforests but on its edges). Knowing whether the impact of
human land use on ecosystems will be good or bad, by whatever measure we choose
for that normative inquiry, is difficult because the effects of fragmentation and other
land use impacts often exhibit themselves not incrementally, but with a nonlinear
"critical threshold" effect which appears without warning and thereafter produces
dramatic ecological responses. See Kimberly A. With & Thomas 0. Crist, Critical
Thresholds In Species' Responses to Landscape Structure, 76 ECOLOGY 2446, 2446
(1995). Similar challenges are faced in the context of designing marine preserve ar-
eas. See Karen F. Schmidt, Wo-Take' Zones Spark Fisheries Debate, 277 SCIENCE
489, 490-91 (1997) (discussing the issues with regard to size, design, and layout of
marine reserves). While they may be difficult to measure in specific species conte.to,
it seems widely agreed in the scientific community that these factors exist in general
and pose significant challenges for preserve design and management for many spe-
cies.
131. The land development process, particularly the decisions of land develop-
ers, is largely ad hoc, unsystematic, and often based on developers' experience and
"gut feeL" See George A. McBride & Marion Clawson, Negotiation and Land Conver.
sion, 36 J. AM. INST. PLANNERS 22, 25 (1970). As a result, however, the land devel-
opment process becomes highly adaptable to whatever is thrown in its path. A clas-
sic example comes from Vermont, where a state law designed to mitigate the adverse
community and environmental impacts of large-scale developments simply led to a
proliferation of small-scale projects designed to avoid the effects of the law. See
Thomas L. Daniels & Mark B. Lapping, Has Vermont's Land Use Control Program
Failed?, 50 J. AM. PLAN. ASSN 502, 507 (1984). Growth control programs in general
have thus been criticized as being too narrow in problem specification, overly opti-
mistic in expected compliance, and inattentive to the potential for unintended re-
sponses and results. See Deakin, supra note 126, at 13-14 (criticizing planners for
narrowly focusing on the increased traffic resulting from population growth and ig-
noring the increases attributable to existing residents); Lee R. Epstein, Where Yards
Are Wide: Have Land Use Planning and Law Gone Astray?, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL
L. & POLY REV. 345, 356-66 (1997) (criticizing the "scientific" basis of land planning
law for contributing to "sprawl"-large expanses of low-density, single-use develop-
ment at the edges of urban development).
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regulation, humans, and the purported beneficiary of regulation,
the environment, display the discontinuities and synergies char-
acteristic of complex adaptive systems. Thus, it is not surprising
to find few issues of environmental policy that can be described
as easy, uncomplicated, or well-defined. Rather, environmental
policy issues usually are multidimensional and multidiscipli-
nary; they involve monetary and nonmonetary aspects; they in-
volve scarce resources upon which the effects of policy decisions
may be irreversible; their impacts are multisectorial and felt
over broad scales of time and space; and they carry with them
high levels of uncertainty of causation and outcome.
By and large, unfortunately, modern American environ-
mental law is not designed based on that fundamental reality.
Rather, both the present structure of the law as well as the most
touted proposed reforms display an amazing degree of ignorance
of complex adaptive system dynamics. The underlying tradition
of environmental law-a tradition that is hardly abandoned in
current reform frameworks-is based on a conception of nature
as uniformitarian, a nature in which change takes place, but in
the form of trends that are capable of extrapolation and predic-
tion which lead toward an ordered state of equilibrium. We know
that this paradigm is a fiction; so why does our legal framework
cling to it?
A. The Fallacious Uniformitarian Premises of Environmental
Law-Examples from the Endangered Species Act
The structure of environmental law provides a striking illus-
tration of how society has attempted, through the law, to tame
the complex adaptive systems that make up our world. We do so,
however, not with complex adaptive system structure in mind,
but rather with the mind set of classical science. A fitting exam-
ple is found in the Endangered Species Act ("ESA"), '32 which, in
explicit recognition of ecosystem-level dynamics, purports to
"provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endan-
gered species and threatened species depend may be con-
served,"'33 but does so in a manner that can only be called reduc-
tionist, linearist, and predictivist."' Indeed, ecosystems appear
132. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
133. Id. § 1531(b).
134. The statute has been roundly criticized for not following through with co-
herent ecosystem management measures. See Holly Doremus, Patching the Ark: Im-
proving Legal Protection of Biological Diversity, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 265, 304-17 (1991)
(faulting the ESA for failing to protect biological and species diversity); James
Drozdowski, Saving an Endangered Act: The Case for a Biodiversity Approach to
ESA Conservation Efforts, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 553, 582-85 (1995) (criticizing
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to have been the last thing on Congress's mind when it drafted
the ESA.'
1. Reductionism. The core provisions of the ESA require the
Secretaries of the Departments of the Interior and Commerce to
"list" species that are determined to be endangered or threatened
with extinction.136 Further, the "critical habitat" of each such
species is to be designated,137 and a species "recovery plan" must
be prepared." Federal agencies must avoid "jeopardizing" the
the ESA for narrowly focusing on the protection of specific "endangered" or
"threatened" species and ignoring the ecosystem as a whole); Andrew A. Smith et al.,
The Endangered Species Act at Twenty: An Analytical Survey of Federal Endangered
Species Protection, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1027, 1069-72 (1993) (characterizing the
ESA as a "reactive" statute that does little to prevent species from becoming endan-
gered and arguing that a "proactive" ecosystem protection approach would be more
effective).
135. The discussion that follows in the text is not intended to provide a compre-
hensive overview of the ESA, but rather to focus on its basic structural orientation.
For comprehensive discussions of the core ESA programs, see generally RICHARD
IrrELL, ENDANGERED AND OTHER PROTECTED SPECIES (1992); Oliver A. Houck,
The Endangered Species Act and Its Implementation by the U.S. Departments of In-
terior and Commerce, 64 U. COLO. L. REv. 277, 279 (1993) (claiming that despite its
seemingly rigid blueprint, the ESA has been implemented in a discretionary man-
ner); James C. Kilbourne, The Endangered Species Act Under a Microscope: A
Closeup Look From a Litigator's Perspective, 21 ENVTL. L. 499, 501 (1991) (focusing
on the ESA's "key provisions" from a litigator's view). Some, but clearly not all, of
the deficiencies identified here are addressed in proposed ESA reform legislation.
See S. 1180, 105th Cong. (1997).
136. Section 4(a)(1) of the ESA requires the Secretaries to designate any species
of plant or animal the continued existence of which is "endangered" or "threatened."
See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1). For an overview of the definitions and procedures used
for listing species, see LITTELL, supra note 135, at 15-25; Houck, supra note 135, at
280-96; J.B. Ruhl, Section 4 of the ESA-The Cornerstone of Species Protection Law,
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'r, Summer 1993, at 26, 26-29, 67-68.
137. Section 4(a)(3) of the ESA requires the Secretaries to designate the "critical
habitat" of listed species "to the ma-ximum extent prudent and determinable." 16
U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3). For an overview of the critical habitat designation process, see
L-TrELL, supra note 135, at 26-27; Houck, supra note 135, at 296-315 (claiming that
the concept of protecting critical habitat "has turned out to be an agony of the ESA71;
James Salzman, Evolution and Application of Critical Habitat Under the Endan-
gered Species Act, 14 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 311, 331-38 (1990) (examining the
"critical habitat" provision as the strongest enforcement provision of the ESA);
Katherine Simmons Yagerman, Protecting Critical Habitat Under the Federal En-
dangered Species Act, 20 ENvTL. L. 811, 834-45 (1990) (maintaining that the ESA
has not furthered its mandate for habitat protection).
138. Section 4(f) of the ESA requires the Secretaries to "develop and implement
plans ... for the conservation and survival of endangered species and threatened
species." 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f). For an overview of the history and potential of the re-
covery planning process under § 4(f) of the ESA, see LI'rELL, supra note 135, at 28-
30; Federico Cheever, The Road to Recovery: A New Way of Thinking About the En-
dangered Species Act, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 34-42 (1996) (providing a history of the
recovery program); Houck, supra note 135, at 344-51 (arguing that the scope and
definition of "recovery" in the ESA provides a broad mandate yet has been plagued
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continued existence of such species,'39 and all persons must
ensure that they do not "take" endangered animal species.14 °
What happened to ecosystems?
Indeed, the Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS"), which im-
plements the ESA for the Department of Interior, and the Na-
tional Marine Fisheries Service ("NMFS"), which is part of the
Department of Commerce, recently declined to adopt a policy of
basing species population listing decisions on the importance of a
population to the ecosystem in which it occurs.' The agencies
explained that "[dlespite its orientation toward conservation of
ecosystems, the Services do not believe the Act provides author-
ity to recognize a potential [population] as significant on the ba-
sis of the importance of its role in the ecosystem in which it oc-
curs.""' Similarly, they rejected a proposal that stresses
uniqueness and irreplaceability of ecological functions in such
by a history of doubtful effectiveness).
139. Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA initiates a complicated set of provisions flowing
from the duty of federal agencies to consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service
("FWS") and the National Marine Fisheries Service ("NMFS") to "insure that any
action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency ... is not likely to jeopard-
ize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result
in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species which is deter-
mined... to be critical." 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). For an overview of the interagency
consultation procedure under § 7 of the ESA, see LITrELL, supra note 135, at 52-54;
Houck, supra note 135, at 315-29; Kilbourne, supra note 135, at 530-64 (explaining
the requirements and procedures of the conference process).
140. The most powerful regulatory consequence to flow from species listing, and
perhaps the most powerful regulatory provision in all of environmental law, is found
in § 9(a) which makes it unlawful for "any person subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States to... take any such species within the United States or the territorial
sea of the United States." 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B). For an overview of the "take"
prohibition as implemented, see LITTELL, supra note 135, at 70-73; Federico
Cheever, An Introduction to the Prohibition Against Takings in Section 9 of the En-
dangered Species Act of 1973: Learning to Live with a Powerful Species Preservation
Law, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 109, 109 (1991) (describing § 9 of the ESA as "simple, un-
ambiguous, and breathtaking in its reach and power"); Albert Gidari, The Endan-
gered Species Act: Impact of Section 9 On Private Landowners, 24 ENVTL. L. 419,
426-43 (1994) (evaluating the effect of § 9 on landowners through the example of the
Northern Spotted Owl); Kilbourne, supra note 135, at 572-84 (analyzing section 9 of
the ESA and the regulatory definition of "harm"); Steven P. Quarles et al., Sweet
Home and the Narrowing of Wildlife "Take" Under Section 9 of the Endangered Spe-
cies Act, 26 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10003, 10003-04 (1996) (analyzing § 9 of
the ESA in light of Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Ore-
gon, 515 U.S. 687 (1995)).
141. See Policy Regarding the Recognition of Distinct Vertebrate Population
Segments Under the Endangered Species Act, 61 Fed. Reg. 4722, 4723 (1996). There
is increasing evidence that the number of genetically distinct populations of a spe-
cies is an important factor in the species's sustainability. See Jennifer B. Hughes et
al., Population Diversity: Its Extent and Extinction, 278 SCIENCE 689, 689-91 (1997).
142. Policy Regarding the Recognition of Distinct Vertebrate Population Seg-
ments Under the Endangered Species Act, 61 Fed. Reg. 4722, 4723 (1996).
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listing decisions, because they believe the ESA "is not intended
to establish a comprehensive biodiversity conservation program,
and it would be improper for the Services to recognize a potential
[population] as significant and afford it the Act's substantive
protections solely or primarily on these grounds.""
The agencies' decisions on these points, both of which are le-
gally accurate, illustrate the reductionist boundaries of the ESA
in its current form. Decisions must be made only about the spe-
cies, based only on the status of the species, and only on behalf of
the species. The example of the Snow Goose population explo-
sion, which is now threatening ecosystems upon which other
species depend, illustrates the folly of the reductionist ap-
proach.'" Species-based decisions might incidentally involve con-
sideration of ecosystem-level conditions and lead incidentally to
ecosystem-level protection, but the ESA definitely is not the En-
dangered Ecosystem Act.
Nevertheless, the ESA provides a classic example of the
power of reductionism and its intoxicating effect on our percep-
tion of the world. Many commentators continue to advocate that
the species-specific approach to conservation policy is superior to
broader ecosystem-based models, particularly when an individ-
ual species can be identified to serve as a surrogate for manage-
ment of larger ecosystems.' These so-called "indicator species"
represent precisely the kind of reductionist shortcut that has
proved so successful in classical science as a means of approxi-
mating reality. But they are not reality, and as ecosystem-wide
degradation becomes an increasingly real threat, these fabrica-
tions will increasingly serve less useful to reaching sound man-
agement decisions.
The central flaw in the indicator species approach is that it
relies on a linear-causal approach to problem solving, an ap-
proach that is deeply ingrained in our culture and affects the
way in which we conceptualize reality.'" The premise is simple:
if the indicator species is in decline, it is because of degradation
of the ecosystem. Therefore, if we can reverse the decline of the
indicator species, the ecosystem will improve as well."7 That
143. Id. at 4724.
144. See Snow Goose Population, supra note 94, at <http://v/vw.fws.gov-l>
145. See, e.g., Oliver A. Houck, On the Law of Biodiversity and Ecosystem Man-
agement, 81 MINN. L. REV. 869, 960 (1997) (advocating the species-specific approach
as "objective, science based and enforceable").
146. See Ted Lumley, Complexity and the "Learning Organization,' COM-
PLEXIr, May-June 1997, at 14, 14-16.
147. For a general discussion of the deficiencies of using the linear-causal ap-
proach in management decisions for complex adaptive systems, see Lumley, supra
note 146, at 14-15.
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approach works reasonably well for systems whose components
are only weakly and linearly coupled; but, in complex adaptive
systems, the linear-causal approach "delivers seriously flawed
views and solution approaches." ' Thus, while the indicator spe-
cies approach has gotten us far in ecosystem conservation be-
cause of its shortcut qualities, it is proving increasingly flawed
both biologically and politically as the pressure on ecosystems as
ecosystems increases. 9
The problem with the indicator species approach biologically
is that it leads to a static view of ecosystems. The fact that a spe-
cies acts as an indicator of the health of an ecosystem does not
necessarily mean that the species's health is essential to the
health of the ecosystem, or even that the ecosystem for which it
serves as an indicator is a particularly desirable one in terms of
the species community and ecosystem functions. 0 Once we pick
the indicator species in an ecosystem and base management de-
cisions on that species's continued viability, we have necessarily
short-circuited the adaptive processes in the ecosystem."' If we
prop up one species, other species may suffer, and why should
they? As we preserve the "snapshot" ecosystem needed to sup-
port the indicator species, have we precluded other species as-
semblies that would have been brought about as a result of non-
linear responses to environmental disturbance regimes (flood,
fire, drought)? How do we decide at which point to paralyze the
ecosystem dynamics in the name of preserving the static ecosys-
tem state of choice? The indicator species approach requires an-
swers to these questions, questions that do not make sense if we
view ecosystems as complex adaptive systems.
148. Id. at 22.
149. See Houck, supra note 145, at 954-59 (recognizing the political and biologi-
cal disputes over the indicator species approach).
150. Species that are essential to the dynamic health of the ecosystem, but
which do not necessarily act as indicators of the health of any particular single state
of the ecosystem, are known as "keystone species." See F. Stuart Chapin III et al.,
supra note 62, at 501 (claiming that "keystone species" have "effects that are sub-
stantially greater than one would expect"). Managing for the support of keystone
species, because they are more directly related to the ecosystem functions, may
prove superior to the indicator species approach as a means of ecosystem manage-
ment. Recent research indicates, however, that most species individually are not
critically important to the continuing diversity of biological evolution. See Sean Nee
& Robert M. May, Extinction and the Loss of Evolutionary History, 278 SCIENCE 692,
692-94 (1997)
151. For example, in ecosystems where species compete and thus fluctuate in
numbers according to complex predator-prey cycles, managing to support any one
species can have serious effects on the others. See Louis W. Botsford et al., The
Management of Fisheries and Marine Ecosystems, 277 SCIENCE 509, 511 fig.3 (1997)
(providing the example of limiting takes of a conch in an intertidal ecosystem in
Chile that led to the decline of a mussel species and the rise of three species of bar-
nacles).
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To be sure, despite its flawed portrayal of ecosystem dy-
namics, the indicator species approach may provide the political
muscle for preventing adverse human disturbance of the ecosys-
tem and thus justify the artificially imposed stasis of the ecosys-
tem."' But this political justification is becoming increasingly
tenuous as well, as it focuses public attention and debate on the
fate of species rather than of ecosystems. When the species is in-
significant in the public's eye-such as a fly, a snail, or a bee-
tle-it becomes difficult to portray the underlying ecosystem as
significant. Indicator species might provide a means to "convene
the meeting and draw a bottom line,"1" but when the meeting is
about a fly and only a fly, the bottom line might not get us where
we would otherwise want to be on behalf of the ecosystem." If
we want people and the political processes in which they partici-
pate to be concerned with ecosystems, we should develop legal
frameworks that provide relevant information and decision
making contexts. Hence, it is not that those who advocate a
broader ecosystem approach in favor of the indicator species ap-
proach "simply have not opened their eyes,"" but rather that
they are looking past the fabricated solutions for the real an-
swers.
2. Linearism. We know that the complex webs of
ecosystems lead to species-level population dynamics that
fluctuate chaotically based on natural and anthropogenic
disturbances.'56 Nevertheless, the picture one receives from the
ESA is of a linear process of species decline and, through ESA
intervention, improvement-a down escalator and an up
escalator.
152. See Houck, supra note 145, at 959-60 (claiming that "the ESA provides the
muscle for the discussions" between developers, planners, and environmentalists
and asserting that ecosystem planning efforts have come about "through the use of
indicator species").
153. Id. at 959.
154. An excellent example of this failure of the indicator species approach politi-
cally is the Delhi Sands Flower loving fly, an indicator species for Delhi Sands eco-
system formations in southern California, the listing of which lowered the heavy
hand of ESA protection on several communities suffering from persistent unem-
ployment and economic stagnation. Asking those communities to sacrifice important
public works projects and much-needed economic development projects in order to
save a fly simply did not sit well with the local community. See Thomas C. Jackson,
Sustainable Development and the Endangered Species Act, _ NAT. RESOURCES &
ENVTr - (forthcoming) (draft on file with the Houston Law Review). As a result, any
talk today of the importance of managing the dwindling Delhi Sands ecosystem as a
whole is unlikely to engender much public support-it is more likely to be remem-
bered as simply "fly habitat."
155. Houck, supra note 145, at 959.
156. See Brown, supra note 1, at 421-32 (describing how species diversity leads
to networks of interations and food webs).
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Species that are thriving do not count under the ESA. Once
a species is in decline, the ESA treats it as a "candidate" for
listing, though no protections apply to such species.'57 Once a
species is "likely to become an endangered species within the
foreseeable future," it is "threatened."158 Then, when the species
"is in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion
of its range," it is "endangered."159 Recovery plans are designed to
turn that linear decline process around and to send the species
on the up escalator.60
It is difficult to fit emerging biological concepts of critical
minimum viable populations and habitats into that gradualist
vision of species. A species may appear to be thriving but in fact
be in deep peril, or vice versa. 1' Who would have known, for ex-
ample, that the tambalacoque tree was "endangered" the mo-
ment the dodo went extinct?62 Biology simply is not linear in the
sense that the ESA suggests. Hence, as Professor Jonathan
Baert Wiener states: "Law cannot require 'a balance of flora and
fauna' not because it would be too difficult, but because the term
is meaningless: populations of various organisms are perpetually
in flux, landscapes change, climates change, and definitions of
species and ecosystems change."163
3. Predictivism. Inherent in the ESA is the assumption that
we can predict the fate of species and the effects of both positive
157. See 16 U.S.C. § 1535(d)(1) (1994).
158. Id. § 1532(20).
159. Id. § 1532(6).
160. See id. § 1533(f) (requiring the development of recovery plans for the con-
servation and survival of endangered and threatened species).
161. As biologists increasingly face this amorphous state of affairs, they have
found it increasingly difficult to provide policy advice relevant to the ESA frame-
work. The typical policy prescription in conservation biology circles is to say simply
that "maintaining as much wild land as possible is the most viable option." Michael
J. Samways, The Art of Unintelligent Tinkering, 10 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1307,
1307 (1996). Some conservation biologists concede, however, that this is not a very
helpful policy guideline as it suggests no end boundary to preservation. See John M.
Hagan, Environmentalism and the Science of Conservation Biology, 9 CONSER-
VATION BIOLOGY 975, 975 (1995) (conveying the conflicting emotions and thoughts of
a conservation biologist). The central problem in defining such a boundary is that
"the relationship between socioeconomic factors and biodiversity loss is not well un-
derstood." Deborah J. Forester & Gary E. Machlis, Modeling Human Factors That
Affect the Loss of Biodiversity, 10 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1253, 1253 (1996). Hence,
"[piresently there is no method to determine how much land should be protected to
maintain an ecosystem's integrity." Steven R. Beissinger et al., Null Models for As-
sessing Ecosystem Conservation Priorities: Threatened Birds as Titers of Threatened
Ecosystems in South America, 10 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1343, 1344 (1996).
162. Refer to note 88 supra (relating the mutualistic relationship between the
tambalacoque tree and the dodo).
163. Jonathan Baert Weiner, Beyond the Balance of Nature, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L.
& POL F. 1, 11 (1996).
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and negative human intervention. A species is considered
"threatened" when it is "likely" to become endangered.& It is
classified as "endangered" when it is "in danger of extinction."''
A recovery plan must detail "site-specific management actions"
and state "objective, measurable criteria" that will tell us when
to remove the species from the list.' An action constitutes a
prohibited "take" if it will foreseeably lead to the death or injury
of a protected species.1"
To many biologists these must be nonsensical undertakings
worth pursuing only because there is no other mechanism avail-
able in current law for translating biological science into policy.
Take the case of the Spruce-fir Moss spider, a small spider en-
demic to high-elevation eastern spruce-fir forests and threatened
by forest desiccation caused by, among other things, acid precipi-
tation." Predicting the species's future status requires predict-
ing the effects of sulfur dioxide emission regulations, the com-
plex effects of declining atmospheric dusts and atmospheric acid
levels, and the combination of both over eastern forests. The spe-
cies recovery depends little on site-specific actions. The acid rain
emanates from dispersed actions taken far away and can only be
measured based on factors such as the average annual rainfall
and amount of sunlight reaching rock surfaces. Those conditions
are difficult to predict reliably. The reality is that we will know
the spider is endangered when we cannot find many of them. Al-
ternatively, we will know that it is recovered if we find a lot of
them, assuming we know where and when to look for them. Be-
yond that, prediction under the ESA is a dangerous game.
B. The Shortcomings of Current Reform Models
It has become almost a cich6 to point out that environ-
mental law keeps changing. The question is whether any of that
change responds meaningfully to change in the subject matter of
environmental law. For example, adding species to the ESA list
of endangered species is a change in environmental law, but the
fact that we keep adding endangered species to the list suggests
the ESA is not adequately addressing the causes of ecosystem
164. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20).
165. Id. § 1532(6).
166. Id § 1533(f)(1)(B)(i)-(ii).
167. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 515
U.S. 687, 696-98 & n.9 (1995) (stating that the regulations do not cover conse-
quences that are not foreseeable).
168. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants: Proposal to List the
Spruce-Fir Moss Spider as an Endangered Species, 59 Fed. Reg. 3825, 3825-26
(1994).
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degradation. Nevertheless, although almost no one denies the
need for more change in environmental law, very few proposals
for implementing reform demonstrate an appreciation of complex
adaptive systems as a model. Instead, the two dominant con-
flicting reform models advocate incremental change on the one
hand and wholesale deregulation on the other. The former in-
volves mere baby steps around the fitness landscape; while the
latter is a deluded attempt to reverse the system and return to
simpler times.
1. The Weak Reform Model: The Mirage of "Reinvention"
Rhetoric. One of the most active and concerted reform efforts in
environmental law is taking place through the Clinton
Administration's overhaul of ESA administrative policies and
programs. In 1994, the Departments of Interior and Commerce,
which implement the ESA through the FWS and the NMFS
respectively, launched an effort to overhaul the ESA without
waiting for Congress to lead."9 The agencies responded to the
same two themes that have fueled the reauthorization debate in
Congress. On the one hand, the message from biologists
increasingly is that effective species conservation requires a
focus that goes beyond individual species to protection and
management of whole ecosystems. 7 ° On the other hand, property
rights advocates have increasingly claimed that the ESA runs
roughshod over business and landowner interests to protect
critters of little economic value.'7' The problem, as I have
demonstrated, is that neither of those concerns is addressed
satisfactorily in the existing ESA.
The agencies' administrative reform of the ESA began in
March 1994 with FWS's publication of An Ecosystem Approach to
Fish and Wildlife Conservation: An Approach to More Effectively
Conserve the Nation's Biodiversity.'7' The agency portrayed this
169. Actually, it may have been a nudge by the judiciary that spurred the effort.
In response to the court's ruling in Pacific Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050
(9th Cir. 1994), the FWS and the NMFS published a proposed rule to establish
"alternative" regulations called the Joint Counterpart Endangered Species Act Sec-
tion 7 Consultation Regulations, 60 Fed. Reg. 39,921 (1995) (to be codified at 50
C.F.R. pt. 402).
170. The joint consultation regulations are intended to "provide a framework for
consultation on program-level or ecosystem-level decisions, as opposed to project-
level decisions." Joint Counterpart Endangered Species Act Section 7 Consultation
Regulations, 60 Fed. Reg. 39,921 (1995) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 402).
171. See Jonathan H. Adler & Kelly Anne Fitzpatrick, For the Environment,
Against Overregulation, WALL ST. J., July 29, 1996, at A12.
172. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, AN ECOSYSTEM
APPROACH TO FISH AND WILDLIFE CONSERVATION: AN APPROACH TO MORE EF-
FECTIVELY CONSERVE THE NATION'S BIODIVERSITY (1994).
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policy document as its road map for applying "the concept of
managing and protecting ecosystems to everything the Service
does."17 The agency thereby explicitly endorsed the emerging
goal of protection and management of whole ecosystems. The
second reform track was launched one year later, with FWS's
publication of Protecting America's Living Heritage: A Fair, Co-
operative and Scientifically Sound Approach to Improving the
Endangered Species Act."7 This document outlined the agency's
plan to "provide effective conservation of threatened and endan-
gered species and fairness to people through innovative, coopera-
tive, and comprehensive approaches."7 ' Recently the two agen-
cies jointly published a policy statement emphasizing
opportunities to merge and harmonize the two agendas through
measures that serve both interests.17 To be sure, there is a risk
of overselling the degree to which the "ecosystem approach" and
"fair approach" agendas can be merged. At some points the issue
of species conservation really does come down to choosing be-
tween conflicting constraints. But the agencies should be given
credit for inventing some truly ground-breaking approaches"
that have gotten former enemies on speaking terms.
173. Id. at 5.
174. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., U.S. DEP' OF INTERIOR, PROTECTING
AMERICA'S LIVING HERITAGE: A FAIR, COOPERATIVE AND SCIENTIFICALLY SOUND
APPROACH TO IMPROVING THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (1995).
175. Id. at 1.
176. See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., U.S. DEP*T OF INTERIOR, & U.S. NAT'L
MARINE FISHERIES SERV., U.S. DEPT OF COMMERCE, IMAKING THE ESA WORK
BETTER: IMPLEMENTING THE 10 POINT PLAN... AND BEYOND 2 (1997) (discussing
the significant progress made by the cooperative efforts of the federal agencies to-
ward protecting species earlier and more efficiently than ever).
177. An example of the agencies' innovative approach is found in the proposed
"Safe Harbor" program introduced as a way of providing incentives for landowners
to maintain or enhance their land as a home to listed species. See Announcement of
Draft Safe Harbor Policy, 62 Fed. Reg. 32,178, 32,178 (1997). While a landowner
may not injure a listed species, either directly or indirectly by destroying its essen-
tial habitat, without express take authorization from the agencies, nonfederal land-
owners have no duty to expand habitat or otherwise improve the condition of a listed
species. See id. And why would they, unless they desire expanded land use restric-
tions? Under the Safe Harbor policy, however, the agencies are "providing an incen-
tive to property owners to restore, enhance, or maintain habitats resulting in net
conservation benefit to endangered and threatened species." Id. at 32,179. Landown-
ers who improve conditions for listed species under a Safe Harbor agreement vll
receive a permit providing assurance that the landowner may implement land uses
in the future so long as those uses do not degrade the species population and habitat
below baseline levels in existence on the property before the permit is issued. See
Safe Harbor Agreements and Candidate Conservation Agreements, 62 Fed. Reg.
32,189, 32,190-92 (1997) (describing proposed amendments to 50 C.F.R. § 17.22). For
comprehensive reviews of this and other specific measures the agencies have prom-
ulgated to implement the reform agendas, see J.B. Ruhl, While the Cat's Asleep-
The Making of the 'New" Endangered Species Act, 12 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T _
(forthcoming) (draft on file with the Houston Law Review); J.B. Ruhl, Who Needs
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Nevertheless, these efforts must be placed in the larger con-
text of the ESA, the provisions of which act as a niche limiting
how far the agencies can go toward adaptive solutions.'78 Already
some courts have chastised the agencies for experimenting in
ways the courts have found to cross beyond what the ESA per-
mits.7 9 In essence, the ESA has constrained the boundaries of
the fitness landscape for ecosystem conservation policies and
limited us to walking across that boxed-in landscape in search of
fitter solutions. It is commendable that the agencies have em-
barked on that walk, but it would be folly to believe that the
agencies will reach a solution that responds to the highly com-
plex land-use system dynamics that are leading to increased lo-
cal and global pressure on ecosystems. Walking the landscape
within a tightly defined niche can lead to temporary fixes; real
reform requires breaking out of the box.
2. The Absurdly Strong Reform Model: Disaster Through
Deregulation. One of the dangers of opening the ESA reform
discussion sufficiently wide to make long fitness landscape
jumps possible is that it appears to lend some credence to the
wholesale deregulation reform model. The deregulation approach
assumes that because the ESA has not solved the ecosystem
degradation problem, removing the ESA will. Thus, for example,
some recent ESA reform bills introduced in Congress would have
abandoned the existing ESA structure altogether and replaced it
with a program designed to induce desirable landowner behavior
through tax and subsidy incentives.18 The Cato Institute has
advocated even more sweeping deregulation, proposing that we
base federal biodiversity conservation solely on "noncoercive
market processes." 8' But while eliminating the ESA and putting
essentially nothing but the market in its place would result in a
Congress?-An Agenda for Administrative Reform of the Endangered Species Act, 6
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. _ (forthcoming) (draft on file with the Houston Law Review).
178. As illustrated in the Draft Safe Harbor Policy announcement, the FWS and
the NMFS cannot mandate or require under the ESA private land ovners to manage
their property to the benefit of endangered species. See Announcement of Draft Safe
Harbor Policy, 62 Fed. Reg. at 32,178.
179. See, e.g., Defenders of Wildlife v. Babbitt, 958 F. Supp. 670, 679-80 (D.D.C.
1997) (finding that in deciding not to list a species, the FWS relied on a standard
that "contrasts starkly" with the standard mandated by the ESA).
180. See H.R. 2364, 104th Cong. § 2 (1995) (stating that the United States
should provide incentives for both state and private efforts to "create, maintain, and
implement effective endangered species programs").
181. Allan Y, Fitzsinmons, Federal Ecosystem Management: A "Train Wreck" in
the Making, POLy ANALYsIS, Oct. 26, 1994, at 1, 23.
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long jump across the fitness landscape, this approach ignores
several other important features of complex systems.
The fundamental mistake of the deregulation approach is
that it is based on the same linear-causal problem solving ap-
proach that has shaped the ESA itself. The premise is that the
ESA is not simply part of the problem, but that it is the prob-
lem. 8  What is abundantly certain, however, is that it is delu-
sional to believe that deregulation will somehow turn back the
clock to a time when neither ecosystem degradation pressures
nor property rights concerns were acutely in conflict as they are
today. The fact that the ESA is not effectively resolving that con-
flict does not mean that it has caused the conflict or that reeling
in the ESA will move us back along the time line over which the
conflict has evolved. Indeed, there is nothing we can do to re-
verse the nonlinear co-evolution of ecosystems, technology,
economies, and land use that has led to the ecosystem degrada-
tion problem. All we can do is change, and we hope thereby to
improve, the direction in which the problem-solving process is
headed.
Would wholesale deregulation improve the direction of eco-
system conservation policy? Maybe. The possibility cannot be
ruled out. But the elimination of law from the solution to this or
any problem of environmental law should be used only if we are
reasonably convinced, first, that law itself cannot be reorganized
to work more adaptively toward solutions to the problem, and
second, that doing so would not improve the capacity for adap-
tive social responses above that which exists through other sys-
tems such as the market, public education, and so on. In other
words, we should recognize that we have more than law at our
disposal and that the presence of other social problem-solving
mechanisms does not mean that law cannot work adaptively to
improve the overall fitness of our solutions. The incremental re-
form model puts all the emphasis on law in a static state, refus-
ing to experiment not only with law, but also with other social
problem-solving systems." The deregulation model puts all the
emphasis on the other social problem-solving systems, using law
only as an adjunct for putting them in motion." The problem
with the deregulation model, therefore, is that it prevents us,
just as much as does the incrementalist model, from deliberately
trying to make long jumps through focused legal reform. In
short, neither of the prevailing reform models permits us to
think of environmental law as a complex adaptive system.
182. Refer to note 180 supra and accompanying text.
183. Refer to notes 169-77 supra and accompanying text.
184. Refer to notes 180-81 supra and accompanying text.
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IV. THUS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW MUST BE REVOLUTIONIZED WITH
COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS AS ITS MODEL
Environmental law has hit the same wall into which science
in general has slammed-the last five percent of the problems
are the hardest to solve." Conventional reductionist methods
and linear models have taken us far in both realms, solving the
first ninety-five percent of the problems with tremendous effi-
ciency, ' but both incremental additions to and wholesale aban-
donment of that approach seem to lead in the wrong direction.
The last five percent will require a revolution in the design of
environmental law.
It is one thing to recognize that ecosystems, technology,
economies, and land use behave as complex adaptive systems18
and that environmental law cannot treat them as anything else.
It is quite another thing to ask how environmental law itself
must be designed as a system given that reality. Law is one of so-
ciety's problem-solving mechanisms. As complex adaptive sys-
tems research has demonstrated, however, it is very difficult to
solve problems in such systems unless you think like a complex
adaptive system. I posit, therefore, that the environmental law
we use to address the problems of the future in environmental
quality must itself incorporate the qualities of its subject mat-
ter-in other words, we must think of environmental law as a
complex adaptive system.
A. The Key Design Questions-A Plan for the Revolution
The starting point in the reform process is to ask the rele-
vant questions. The prevailing environmental law reform models
fail to address the fundamental set of complex adaptive system
design issues. The incremental reform model involves timid,
highly planned walks around the existing landscape, testing for
only slightly higher fitness peaks while in fact all nearby peaks
are eroding because the rest of the world is changing rapidly.
The deregulation model puts all the marbles into one long dis-
tance landscape jump, but as a roll of the dice rather than with
conscious deliberation as to direction and distance. A long jump
is needed, but what is also needed, and what humans have the ad-
vantage of being capable of conceiving, is a plan for the revolution. 8
185. Refer to note 13 supra and accompanying text (describing the limits of re-
ductionist science).
186. Refer to note 13 supra and accompanying text.
187. Refer to Part II.B supra and accompanying text.
188. Gerald Emison's proposed design questions, derived as well from complex
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1. Aggregation: Centralization, Devolution, or Something
Else? To talk intelligently of the environmental law decision
making system, we must begin by questioning the system's
component structure. Environmental law and policy decisions
are essentially the emergent properties of the interactions of the
system's decision making components, and, thus, design choices
regarding the "patchiness" and "coupledness" of the components
are critical. The sense of the importance of those questions is
almost instinctive in our constitutional system of government. '6
It is no surprise, therefore, that a central and raging debate
in environmental law focuses on the balance of power between
state and federal governments and the merit of the system of so-
called "cooperative federalism" that has been in place for twenty-
five years and under which the federal government has taken
the policy-shaping and standard-setting role for the states and
their local subdivisions. 9 ' That debate, however, largely ignores
systems analysis, strike at similar themes: (1) Is it a system in which the compo-
nents interact in a complicated manner?; (2) Is the system non-linear and dynamic?;
(3) Is emergence a property of the system?; and (4) Is the system self-similar? See
Emison, supra note 14, at 182-86. The difference between his formulation and mine
is that mine focuses more on the structural characteristics that lead to the behaviors
he identifies; nevertheless, clearly we are aimed in the same direction.
189. See Ruhl, Fitness of Law, supra note 15, at 1467-88.
190. See, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the
Matching Principle: The Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority,
14 YALE L. & POL'Y REVJYALE J. ON REG. 23, 24 (1996) (considering whether envi-
ronmental policy can be improved by reallocating authority for regulation within the
federal system); A. Dan Tarlock, Federalism Without Preemption: A Case Study in
Bioregionalism, 27 PAC. L.J. 1629, 1629-30 (1996) (describing a new federalism by
which the federal government protects biodiversity without the actual displacement
of state law). Some commentators argue that "cooperative federalism" has stifled po-
tentially innovative state approaches. See, e.g., Adam Babich, Our Federalism, Our
Hazardous Waste, and Our Good Fortune, 54 MD. L. RENY. 1516, 1540 (1995)
(observing that "[flor states, [the] cooperative federalism program is part of a pat-
tern of complexity that has generally prevented them from attempting significant
innovations"); Oliver A. Houck & Mfichael Rolland, Federalism in Wetlands Regula-
tion: A Consideration of Delegation of Clean Water Act Section 404 and Related Pro-
grams to the States, 54 MD. L. REV. 1242, 1251-53, 1301-13 (1995) (e.xplaining why
the costs and complexity of delegation of federal wetlands protection programs have
deterred states from assuming such authority and calling for revisions which would
provide the states greater jurisdictional authority); Jerome M. Organ, Limitations
on State Agency Authority to Adopt Environmental Standards More Stringent Than
Federal Standards: Policy Considerations and Interpretive Problems, 54 MD. L. REV.
1373, 1376-93 (1995) (explaining that many states, partially in response to the com-
plexity of the federal program, simply adopt the federal standards as the ma.ximum
state standard and leave it at that, thus suppressing any impetus to innovate). Oth-
ers are of the position that the dominant federal position should be retained. See,
e.g., Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a "Race' and
Is It 'To the Bottom"?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 279-80 (1997) (arguing that interstate
competition for economic development and environmental benefits absent federal
supervision would be detrimental to social welfare and cause a "race-to-the-bottom);
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the qualities that complexity theory -suggests are needed in
adaptive systems. To be truly adaptive, the environmental law
system must be able to operate with many coupled patches ar-
rayed on a variety of nested, coupled levels of organization, in-
cluding levels intermediate in structure to the bottom (local) and
top (federal) of the system. This permeable, nested hierarchy ap-
proach is not contemplated by the local-versus-state-versus-
federal debate that dominates the "cooperative federalism" de-
sign model.
In short, entirely new forms of organizational structures are
needed in order to match environmental law with the complexity
of its subject matter. Watersheds, for example, exist in a nested
hierarchy, open system form: small-scale watersheds (a drainage
ditch fed intermittently by runoff from several farms) feed into
local watersheds (a perennial, stream) that feed into larger re-
gional watersheds (a river tributary) that feed into enormous
multistate and multinational watersheds (the Colorado River)."1
Protection of ecological and economic interests associated with
watersheds, therefore, will require greater reliance on interlocal
organizations, interstate compacts, regionally-oriented autono-
mous federal agencies, and partnerships between all of those as
well as nongovernmental organizations and landowners. These
forms of political organization are constitutionally permissible,
but have been mostly untested and underused.92
Robert Housman, The Devil Is In the Exogenous Variables, ENVTL. F., May-June
1996, at 32, 33 (advocating, from an international environmental lawyer's perspec-
tive, a dominant federal position); Vickie L. Patton, A Balanced Partnership, ENVrL.
F., May-June 1996, at 16, 17 (arguing, as an attorney for the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, in favor of retaining dominant federal position). It is difficult to ignore
the emergence in recent years of a "devolution" sentiment in American society. For
example, although public support for strong environmental protection policies re-
mains high, polls suggest that increasingly the public wishes the actual policy deci-
sion making to be the responsibility primarily of state and local governments. See
Jonathan H. Adler & Kellyanne Fitzpatrick, For the Environment, Against Over-
regulation, WALL ST. J., July 29, 1996, at A12 (stating that 65% of those polled favor
state or local responsibility); Americans Favor State, Local Controls, Poll Says, 27
Env't Rep. (BNA) 801, 801 (1996) (stating that "[miost Americans believe that states
and local governments would do a more efficient job in addressing environmental
concerns than the federal government').
191. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-94-111, ECOSYSTEM
MANAGEMENT: ADDITIONAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO ADEQUATELY TEST A PROMISING
APPROACH 42-44 (1994) (discussing the spatially interlinked nature of watersheds
and other landscape features and the challenges that poses to legal responses).
192. See J.B. Ruhl, Interstate Pollution Control and Resource Development
Planning: Outmoded Approaches or Outmoded Politics?, 28 NAT. RESOURCES J. 293,
308-09 (1988) (discussing the failure of the federal and state governments to give life
to interstate compacts designed to address regional water pollution).
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It is time we "reinvent" environmental law, therefore, not
simply by tinkering with the familiar landscape, as is too fre-
quently what lies behind calls for reform, but by making a long
jump to these new domains. To do so, the local, state, and federal
structures must combine their "genes," engage in the political
equivalent of sex, and make the environmental law governance
system messy in the complex adaptive systems sense." To be
sure, this new approach will result in political processes that are
amorphous, costly, painful, and that require hard work. How-
ever, that investment will improve our chances of cleaning up
the environmental mess we have created in the usual sense of
the word.'4
2. Flows: Is the Market Friend or Foe? What medium is
flowing through environmental law's pipes? What does the
environmental law system consume and convert into its main
product-legal and policy decisions? Clearly the answer, as it is
for many human systems, is information: information about
environmental conditions and trends, about social behaviors and
trends, about anthropogenic impacts on the environment, about
effectiveness of and compliance with law, and so on.
Environmental law decision making relies primarily on having
those bodies of information available in relevant, analyzable
forms. Therefore, the flow design question becomes how to allow
the system to efficiently obtain and make the best use of those
bodies of information.
193. An example of such an approach is found in the Ozone Transport Assess-
ment Group ("OTAG"), a coalition of 37 eastern states that formed to negotiate solu-
tions to the interstate atmospheric transport of ozone precursor air pollutants. See
John Pendergrass, OTAG Opens New Vistas Among States, ENVFL. F., Jan.-Feb.
1997, at 5, 5. One of the thorny issues that had divided the states, and which EPA
had been unable to resolve, was what transport model to use. Once OTAG was
formed, the states eventually put aside their regional preferences, developed a mod-
eling and information analysis method far superior to what EPA or any single state
had been using, and formulated concrete strategy options. See id.; see also OTAG
Report Paves Way for More Cuts in Emissions from Utilities, Officials Say, 28 Env't
Rep. (BNA) 399, 399 (1997). The OTAG states are not in complete harmony, how-
ever, as eastern state members have brought proceedings against midwest state
members to force reductions in emissions by the latter. See John Pendergrass, When
Northeast Meets Midwest, ENVTL. F., Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 6, 6.
194. Several commentators have begun thoughtfully to open the reform debate
wider in this respect, focusing on the need to "find the best fit possible between envi-
ronmental problems and regulatory responses-not to pick a single level of govern-
ment for all problems." Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95
MICH. L. REv. 570, 574 (1996) (footnote omitted). In particular, Professor Errol
Meidinger has explored the issue from a systems perspective, observing that many
of the emerging environmental law problems are largely organizational problems.
See Errol E. Meidinger, Organizational and Legal Challenges for Ecosystem Man-
agement, in CREATING A FORESTRY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 361-79 (Kathryn A.
Kohm & Jerry F. Franklin eds., 1997).
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We have seen two models of information flow thus far in
modern environmental law. First, prior to the 1970s, the com-
mon law served as the primary environmental law system
framework, and thus information flowed principally through the
channels of the common law processes.'95 The problem with that
model, however, was that despite the adaptive nature of the
common law generally, that system was not particularly well
suited to obtaining and analyzing information relevant to the
environmental policy realm.196 Its reliance on plaintiffs claiming
and proving injury to property or person imposes filters and cost
constraints that narrow the diameter of the information flow
pipes to the point at which the common law simply does not fit
well with such system-level issues as management of ecosys-
tems, prevention of risk, and acid rain deposition. The statutori-
fication of environmental law beginning in the 1970s, with its
heavy emphasis on the federal administrative state, widened the
pipes by shifting responsibility for information flows to agencies
as repositories of expertise and analytical power.'97 But, unlike
the common law, the administrative state has not proven to be a
highly adaptive system, and thus has managed to clog the infor-
mation flow pipes with the idiosyncrasies of bureaucracies that
are fundamentally reductionist in organization, linearist in per-
spective, and predictivist in purpose.' 98
The shortcomings of the common law and administrative
state models have led many commentators to observe that the
market may serve as an efficient information flow mechanism for
environmental law.' 99 Unlike the common law, with relatively
195. For a discussion of the evolution of the common law into and out of being
the dominant medium of environmental regulation, see Ruhl, Fitness of Law, supra
note 15, at 1454-62.
196. See id. at 1459 (explaining, for example, that the common law nuisance
cause of action was based on protection of private property).
197. See id. at 1462.
198. See id. at 1463-88 (arguing that although the administrative state has
achieved success in environmental protection, the premises upon which such suc-
cesses were based do not remain valid forever and policy, too, must evolve).
199. The need for even greater reliance generally on market forces to bring
about more efficient protection of environmental factors has been forcefully argued
by many commentators. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reform-
ing Environmental Law: The Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 171, 171 (1988) (arguing that the creative use of market incentives will
save billions of dollars each year, alleviate bureaucratic measures, help balance the
budget, and encourage a more democratic debate by providing the public with an op-
portunity to express their environmental values); Daniel J. Dudek et al., Environ-
mental Policy for Eastern Europe: Technology-Based Versus Market-Based Ap-
proaches, 17 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 9 (1992) (stating that Eastern Europe should
adopt market-based approaches because they encourage businesses and consumers
to avoid products associated with pollutants which reflect added costs and because
such an approach also allows businesses to retain flexibility in the methods they
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low marginal transaction costs, the market's pipes will open as
wide as we want to accept information we deem relevant to envi-
ronmental law and policy decision making. Unlike the adminis-
trative state, the market as a system is highly adaptive and open
ended-the difficulty is not in our inventing it, but in our not
getting in its way."' It provides the best of both worlds-it is suf-
ficiently flexible to accept information however packaged and is
sufficiently adaptive to transport the information to wherever it
is needed even as the needs and destinations change."
In this sense the market may be environmental law's best
friend, or its worst foe. The difference will lie in how active a role
environmental law takes in using the information flow role of the
market to serve environmental law's needs. A complete hands-off
approach may risk failing to identify and address environmental
externalities and other market imperfections; an overbearing
approach could stifle the advantages of the market. Several ex-
amples exist, however, of environmental law deftly either forcing
information into the market 2 or creating the market conditions
choose to avoid pollution); Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, Marhetable Permits:
Lessons for Theory and Practice, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 361, 364-65 (1989) (stating that
marketable permits have the potential to make environmental policy more efficient);
Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental Regulation: A
New Era from an Old Idea?, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 10-11 (1991) (stating that
"substantial gains can be made in environmental protection simply by removing ex-
isting government-mandated barriers to market activity"); Jeremy B. Hockenstein et
al., Crafting the Next Generation of Market-Based Environmental Tools, ENVI.
RON1IENT, May 1997, at 13, 15 (arguing that the two most notable advantages to
market-based instruments are cost-effectiveness and incentives for technological in-
novation); Richard B. Stewart, Reconstitutive Law, 46 MD. L. REV. 86, 89 (1986)
(arguing that the problem in many areas is federal regulation of the wrong sort
rather than too little or too much federal regulation). See generally COMPETITISE
ENTER. INST., FREE MARET ENViROmENTAL BIBLIOGRAPHY 3 (4th ed. 1995-96)
(acknowledging the criticisms of conventional environmental policies and promoting
an alternative to the current "government-knows-best" approach).
200. See PAUL KRUGMAN, THE SELF-ORGANIZING ECONOMY 2-7 (1996)
(explaining how the "invisible hand" leads to order).
201. See id.
202. See Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 401, 104 Stat. 2399, 2584 (1990) (codified at 42
U.S.C. subch. IV) (stating that the "transferrability of allowances between units and
to future years is the key both to the strong environmental policy sought in new Ti-
tle IV of the Act and to the flexibility the Title creates for sources in choosing the
means for complying with their emissions obligations"). The Clean Air Act sulfur di-
oxide emissions trading program for electric utilities, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-7651o
(1994), is widely regarded as the most successful example of integration of market
efficiencies into the command-and-control regulatory structure. See, e.g., ROBERT V.
PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 830-32 (2d ed. 1996); Dallas
Burtraw & Byron Swift, A New Standard of Performance: An Analysis of the Clean
AirAct's Acid Rain Program, 26 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10411, 10411 (1996)
(calling the Acid Rain Program enacted as part of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amend-
ments "one of the most successful environmental programs of the past decade"); By-
ron Swift, The Acid Rain Test, ENVTL. F., May-June 1997, at 17, 17 (reporting that
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for information to flow. °3 In each case, success in achieving the
intended environmental policies is visible.
3. Nonlinearity: Is Project XL Enough? How do we build into
environmental law the capacity to deviate from order, to behave
with nonlinear capacities? The existing environmental law
regime gravitates toward a quantitative-based order of
regulatory response with little room for variation. The Clean Air
Act is built on a foundational premise of nationally uniform
ambient air quality standards."4  The Clean Water Act
establishes national technology standards for emissions from
specified types of facilities.0 ' Room for deviation from the
sameness of environmental standards is small, leading to a
"McLaw" feel to environmental policy across the nation.
Recognizing that flexibility may breed progress, the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency ("EPA") has incorporated programs
for deviation from the model of order with names such as
the 1990 Clean Air Act's Acid Rain Program has significantly decreased the amount
of sulfur dioxide emissions produced by public utilities); Timothy A. Wilkins & Ter-
rell E. Hunt, Agency Discretion and Advances in Regulatory Theory: Flexible Agency
Approaches Toward the Regulated Community as a Model for the Congress-Agency
Relationship, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 479, 491 (1995) (stating that the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990 achieved the required reductions set out by policymakers at
less cost to industry); Utilities Achieve 100 Percent Compliance With EPA Acid Rain
Program, Report Says, 27 Env't Rep. (BNA) 885, 885 (1996) (stating that exceeding
the 1995 emissions reduction goal demonstrates the benefits of providing flexibility
to industry in achieving environmental goals). The program is nonetheless unmis-
takably part of the command-and-control regime, as the "market" for emission
trading is created by regulatory fiat. See Roger K. Raufer, Market-Based Pollution
Control Regulations: Implementing Economic Theory in the Real World, 26 ENVTL.
POLY & L. 177, 184 (1996) (stating that "the market-based systems have relied
heavily upon the command/control framework already in place").
203. For an example of the potential effectiveness of an information based ap-
proach to environmental regulation, companies subject to the toxic release reporting
provisions of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 11023 (1994), reported the total release of 10.4 billion pounds of specified toxic
chemicals into the environment in 1987, down to 2.8 billion pounds in 1993. See
PERCIVAL, supra note 202, at 464-65. See also Toxic Releases Cut By 400 Million
Pounds, Chemical Manufacturers Association Reports, 27 Env't Rep. (BNA) 501, 501
(1996) (discussing reductions in toxic releases between 1988 and 1994); Toxic
Chemical Releases Decrease By 8.6 Percent In 1994, Report Says, 27 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 531, 531 (1996) (stating that an 8.6% decrease in toxic chemicals represents a
decrease of 186 million pounds of toxic chemicals). Industry sources attribute the
reporting requirement as having galvanized industry into voluntary pollution reduc-
tion goals that in many cases exceed anything required by law. See CMA Initiative
Cuts Toxic Emissions 49 Percent Over Six Years, Official Says, 27 Env't Rep. (BNA)
11, 11 (1996).
204. See 42 U.S.C. § 109 (establishing the program for promulgation of national
ambient air quality standards).
205. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1994) (setting up the program for promulgation of
effluent pollution control technology standards).
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"Project XL," the "Common Sense Initiative," "Enterprise for the
Environment," and the "Environmental Leadership Program,"
which project an image of greater flexibility than found in the
usual command-and-control programs."  Collectively known as
"alternative path environmental management," the EPA and
some outsiders have trumpeted them as amounting to a
"reinvention" of the agency."7 These pilot initiatives, however,
generally have been difficult to sell to the rule-habituated stake-
holders of environmental law. Environmental protection inter-
ests are fearful of the risks inherent in experimentation with
flexibility, 8 and industry interests are fearful of the uncertainty
of open-ended regulatory approaches.' So long as the safe har-
bor of the command-and-control model remains the nearby de-
fault position, its gravitational pull appears to be too strong to
allow meaningful innovation through incremental and limited
"alternative paths."
206. See Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects, 62 Fed. Reg. 19,872 (1997);
Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects, 60 Fed. Reg. 27,282 (1995); Common
Sense Initiative Council Federal Advisory Committee, Establishment, 59 Fed. Reg.
55,117 (1994). See generally Camilla Day Buczek, EPA Moves to Cooperative Ap-
proach, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 14, 1996, at 013 (characterizing the EPA's new approach to
environmental regulation a "common-sense" model grounded in sound science and
economics).
207. See, e.g., Timothy J. Mohin, The Alternative Compliance Model: A Bridge to
the Future of Environmental Management, 27 Envtl. L. Rep. (EnvtL L. Inst.) 10345,
10345 (1997) (exploring a reinvention initiative called "alternative path environ-
mental management," touted to be the antidote to the excessive bureaucracy of the
current system); What's All This About Reinvention?, ENVTL. F., Mar.-Apr. 1997, at
34, 34 (surveying the EPA's reinvention efforts in both the private and public sector
including the Reinventing EPA & Environmental Policy project and the Next Gen-
eration project). The EPA even has created a new Office of Reinvention. See Bud
Ward, Now At Bat, ENvTL. F., July-Aug. 1997, at 38, 38 (profiling Chuck Fox, the
associate administrator of the Office of Reinvention). Also, environmental policy
think tanks have formed reinvention work groups. See, e.g., NATIONAL ENVTL POLY
INST., REINVENTING EPA & ENVTL. POLY WORKING GROUP, INTEGRATING EN-
VIRONMENTAL PoLicy (1996).
208. See Rena I. Steinzor, Regulatory Reinvention and Project XL: Does the Em-
peror Have Any Clothes?, 26 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10527, 10527-28 (1996)
(arguing that Project XL is damaging the reputation of industrial self-regulation and
ultimately "undermining EPA efforts to control and prevent pollution"); Concern
About Common Sense Program Prompts Michigan Officials to Withdraw, 27 Envt
Rep. (BNA) 567, 567 (1996) (quoting a Michigan official as stating that
"environmental and environmental justice groups are blocking progress").
209. See Dan Beardsley et al., Improving Environmental Management: What
Works, What Doesn't, ENVIRONMENT, Sept. 1997, at 6, 32; GOP Staff Says Effort To
Reinvent EPA Falls Short, Agency Denounces Findings, 27 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1151,
1151-52 (1996) (noting a recent report which concluded that the EPA has failed to
decrease the number of regulations or to ensure cost-effective implementation); 3M
Decides To Drop Out Of Project XL Process After Disagreement Over Performance
Guarantees, 27 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1045, 1046 (1996) (stating that the conditions im-
posed by the EPA would fail to entrust 3M with the necessary responsibility and ac-
countability and would instead be both restrictive and burdensome).
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To a large extent, the reluctance to dive into flexible ap-
proaches is understandable given the over two decades of quanti-
tative-based environmental law regulation that has preceded
this point. Environmental law is based on a short-term rewards
system rewarding only quantitative results-an approach known
colloquially as "bean-counting."1 ' But when "an organization's
focus is exclusively on quantitative results,... this management
practice tends to 'starve out' creative resources.")11 Because there
is no incentive to experiment, the long-term storage of latent
learning value, learning that has not yet materialized into tangi-
ble performance results, is stultified in a system that focuses on
short-term quantitative results. For instance, if one knows that
performance under a water pollution regulation is measured
each month through a quantitative water quality monitoring
test, why would either the regulator or the regulated entities
think of pollution control approaches that may have a big payoff,
but only after five years?212
The disappointing start of the EPA's flexibility initiative
thus suggests that nonlinearity in the environmental law system
will not come until we are released (that is, release ourselves)
from the quantitative-based command-and-control model-not
simply able to deviate from it at the margins, but rather able to
operate outside its sphere of influence altogether. Problems such
as non-point source water pollution and mobile source air pollu-
tion cry out for approaches based on experimentation, rapid
modification as needed, and variability of performance standards
over small and large scales of time and landscape. Environmental-
ists and industry may demand a system that "locks in" standards
210. See, e.g., John Pendergrass, States, EPA Talk Past Each Other, ENVTL. F.,
Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 8, 8 (stating that the EPA's "measures of the success of its own
and states' enforcement programs continue to rely on counting the numbers of ac-
tions taken... or money spent on environmental projects. EPA relies on these bean-
counting measures despite long-standing understanding that the best measures of
success relate to environmental conditions"); Seven Indicators Broaden Measure-
ment of Compliance With Environmental Laws, 27 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2155, 2155
(1997) (announcing New York's seven new categories for enforcement performance
measurement that nonetheless maintain traditional measures of compliance). The
EPA has responded to this criticism with a commitment to improve the orientation
of performance measurement toward actual environmental conditions. See U.S.
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA STRATEGIC PLAN (Draft June 1997) (copy on file
with the Houston Law Review); U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, MEASURING THE
PERFORMANCE OF EPA's ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE PROGRAM
(Draft Sept. 19, 1997) (copy on file with the Houston Law Review); Steven A. Her-
man, EPA's FY 1997 Enforcement and Compliance Assurance Priorities, NATL
ENvTL. ENFORCEMENT J., Feb. 1997, at 3, 6-7.
211. Lumley, supra note 146, at 19-20.
212. As Lumley explains, "managing performance solely on the basis of 'real,'
quantitatively assessed properties monitored at arbitrary intervals ... fails to ac-
count for latent value resident in creative interference configurations." Id. at 19.
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uniformly across time and space, narrowing the debate between
them to simply address what those standards will be. However,
the reality of how best to manage the environment and human
behavior demands just the opposite.
4. Diversity: The Pendulum-To Swing or Not to Swing?
Disturbance breeds diversity in complex adaptive systems,"3 so
what breeds disturbance in the environmental law system?
Surely the very nature of the subject matter as a set of complex
adaptive systems will push and pull at environmental law, but
disturbance also involves the political process of constantly
reordering priorities and reorganizing structure. The statutory
revolution of environmental law in the 1970s was nothing less
than a massive disturbance in this respect, and no one could
reasonably argue that the 1970s did not give rise to a wealth of
diversity in environmental law. " But today the leaders of that
charge are found calling for an end to disturbance in the political
sense-a form of truce in the continuing debate over the key
design questions of environmental law."'1 Complex adaptive
systems theory calls for just the opposite.
We have to remember that for the environmental law system
to be adaptive, it has to learn; the goal of which is to improve the
management capacity of the legal system over its subject matter.
Learning in a management context, when the subject matter it-
self is complex and adaptive, requires sustained creative interfer-
ence-events that tilt the apple cart-and a willingness to treat the
logic of yesterday as "a disposable expedient." ' Learning of this
kind is "not describable in words, not quantitatively measurable,
213. Refer to notes 2-3 supra and accompanying text.
214. See Ruhl, Fitness of Law, supra note 15, at 1460-62 (discussing the prolif-
eration of federal environmental law in the 1970s).
215. For example, William Ruckelshaus, twice former EPA Administrator and
currently CEO of a major waste disposal company, criticized the Republican take-
over of environmental policy in the 104th Congress as
yet another phase in a dismaying pattern. The anti-environmental push of
the nineties is prompted by the pro-environmental excess of the late eight-
ies, which was promoted by the anti-environmental excess of the early
eighties, which was prompted by the pro-environmental excess of the seven-
ties ..... So what is wrong with this picture? Aren't such changes in empha-
sis part of the fabric of democracy? Yes, but in the case of environmental
policy, these violent swings have had an unusually devastating-perhaps a
uniquely devastating--effect on the executive agency entrusted to carry out
whatever environmental policy the nation says it wants.
William D. Ruckelshaus, Stopping the Pendulum, ENVTL. F., Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 25,
25.
216. See Lumley, supra note 146, at 15 (relating that traditional linear thinking
must be subordinated to the end goal of understanding when addressing complex
order in teams).
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and not explicitly rememberable."217 It just happens. But it hap-
pens best when we are faced with disturbance events and a di-
verse set of responsive tools that allow us to adapt, to experi-
ment, or to throw away yesterday's solution when a new problem
comes along.18 When the pendulum of disturbance stops, the
breeding ground of diversity runs dry. If we plant a stake in the
ground and say that is where environmental law will stick, even
if we are supremely pleased with where it is at the moment, we
have at that point stopped learning.
5. Self Criticality: Can Environmental Law Change Fast
Enough? One would not want to live through the 1970s of
environmental law too often-there was an avalanche of law, a
punctuation of the "equilibrium" if ever there was one in law.219
The push toward wholesale deregulation advocated in the 104th
Congress2. would have done the same. Rather than live from
avalanche to avalanche, how can environmental law work
toward the state of stable disequilibrium inherent in the self-
criticality of complex adaptive systems?
To be sure, environmental law has undergone continuous
change since the 1970s," but principally with regard to sub-
stance, not structure. The cooperative federalism 2 and com-
mand-and-control structure put into place in the 1970s 23 has not
moved very much and is still resistant to change. 2 But to take
full advantage of its complex adaptive system qualities, the
structure of environmental law-more precisely, the answers to
217. Id. at 19.
218. See KAI N. LEE, COMPASS AND GYROScOPE 9 (1993) (inferring that adaptive
management results in reliable learning and understanding, even when faced with
the unexpected, because adaptive management practitioners "correct errors, improve
their imperfect understanding, and change action and plans").
219. See J.B. Ruhl, Biodiversity Conservation and the Ever-Expanding Web of
Federal Laws Regulating Nonfederal Lands: Time for Something Completely Differ-
ent?, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 555, 578-79 (1995) [hereinafter Ruhl, Biodiversity Conser-
vation] (referring to federal environmental regulation that emerged in the 1970s as
"a 'web' of substantive constraints and procedural requirements" and chronicling
some of the laws that make up this web).
220. Refer to Part IH.B.2 supra (characterizing the deregulation approach
adopted by the 104th Congress as linear and potentially disastrous).
221. Refer to note 215 supra.
222. Refer to note 190 supra and accompanying text (discussing the concept of
cooperative federalism).
223. See Emison, supra note 14, at 167 (stating that the command-and-control
system, which is the state's right under the police power to compel action by estab-
lishing and enforcing standards through the administrative and judicial arenas, has
been the nation's principle environmental model since the 1970's).
224. See id. at 172 (explaining that current environmental debate is the same as
in the early 1980's and the result is a "stall-out in the improvement of environmental
quality").
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the previous four design questions-must constantly be reevalu-
ated and be subject to change. This continual reevaluation will
ensure that structural change takes place more often, but hope-
fully with a longer time period between big avalanches. The
adaptive system persists in this state of stable disequilibrium,
constantly shedding stresses by discarding obsolete structure
and making room for new approaches.
B. Three Legs of a Revolutionized Environmental Law-A
Theme for the Revolution
So what shape for environmental law comes out of the de-
sign questions just posed? If our plan is to take advantage of ag-
gregation, flows, nonlinearity, diversity, and self-criticality as I
have proposed,' how do we do so? Of course, any reader who has
been paying attention up until this point will realize that there
is no way to provide many details in response. The beauty of the
Constitution, for example, is that the Founders resisted the
temptation to provide too many details. It is more a collection of
guiding principles grouped under several overarching themes. I
have laid out what I believe should be the guiding principles of
environmental law using the lexicon of complex adaptive systems
theory. Now I will offer some suggestions as to the overarching
themes of environmental law and policy that appear to be most
consistent with those principles.
These themes, like the themes of the Constitution, defy pre-
cise definition, but that is no reason to eschew them as unwork-
able or impractical. Freedom, democracy, justice, and federalism
are themes we associate with the Constitution, but they are not
defined anywhere in that document. Scholars write books trying
to get a handle on what they mean. Congress has passed thou-
sands of laws trying to fulfill their goals. Their meanings are
amorphous and changing, but does that mean they are not useful
organizing themes for government? Indeed, they define our sys-
tem and are the factors we use to distinguish among political
systems, even though we have no code-like definitions of them.
It is only when we demand delivery of lockstep linear-causal
imagery that we must have precisely defined rules by which to
operate." s In contrast, organizing principles born of "intentional
ambiguity" are most useful when we seek the capacity for adaptive
225. Refer to Part HIA supra (reviewing the general properties of complex adap-
tive systems).
226. See Lumley, supra note 146, at 16 (proposing that complex order theory re-
quires the employment of a variety of ambiguous terms, which is distracting to lin-
ear-causal thinking).
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learning."7 It is only when such organizing themes for a system
change that a revolution in learning can take place. 28 This is the
depth of change I propose for environmental law. In this respect,
I differ markedly with those who advocate reform through in-
crementalism and linear extrapolation of the present set of or-
ganizing principles. 9 The current organizing principles, those
established in the federal statutory revolution of the 1970s, do
not seem to fit the current agenda of problems.2 Like coalescing
galaxies, however, new themes are emerging in all corners of en-
vironmental policy making-themes of policy, process, and per-
formance that I believe form a new model of environmental law
and one which more closely fits the complex adaptive system
paradigm.
1. Policy: Sustainable Development. There has been no
dominant organizing policy principle for the last two decades of
environmental law."' Rather, environmental policy has been
decided on an ad hoc basis worked out through an ongoing
struggle between two policy poles: preservationism and
resourcism. 2 Contemporary preservationism is guided by a
consequentialist philosophy directed toward eliminating human
interference with the environment."' Resourcism might be
thought of as the nihilist opposite of preservationism-
eliminating environmental barriers to human pursuits.34
Because each principle in its polar form marginalizes either
environment or humanity, neither is particularly useful in
addressing environmental problems of the future, the common
characteristic of which is the existence of intricate feedback
227. See id. (relaying that intentional ambiguity facilitates the mind's complex
ordering concepts).
228. See id. at 22 (emphasizing that current linear thinking inhibits an im-
proved understanding that may only be obtained through nonlinear, complex think-
ing).
229. See, e.g., Samuel P. Hays, The Future of Environmental Regulation, 15 J.L.
& COM. 549, 584 (1996) (concluding that future environmental regulation will
"movie] ahead in incremental steps from the well-established directions of the dec-
ades since World War II [as a] linear continuation of political forces and strategies"
while calling the contrary view "reformist mythology").
230. Refer to Part IIIA supra (reviewing the command-and-control system).
231. Refer to note 215 supra.
232. See J. Baird Callicott & Karen Mumford, Ecological Sustainability as a
Conservation Concept, CONSERVATION BIOLOGY, Feb. 1997, at 32, 34 (identifying
"resource conservation" and "wilderness preservation" as philosophies that domi-
nated the first three quarters of the twentieth century).
233. See id. at 35 (identifying preservationism as valuing biota for their own
sake and accordingly assigning priority to biological conservation over non-
consumptive human uses of the environment).
234. See id. at 34 (defining resourcism as valuing nature "only to the extent that
is humanly useful").
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cycles between the human and environmental conditions.' For
example, it will do little good to talk of protecting endangered
species in highly-populated, poverty-stricken areas where basic
daily human survival depends on extraction of water, fuelwood,
and other resources from the environment. On the other hand, it
will do little good in such areas to fail to address resource
protection if the collapse of the resource base only worsens the
human condition. By each focusing on only one side of that
feedback cycle, preservationism and resourcism are
fundamentally reductionist and thus doomed to miss the point
more times than not. 6
A policy principle is needed that transcends the preserva-
tionism-resourcism dichotomy to address such complicated
problems in an adaptive manner. The theme that is emerging,
known as sustainable development," holds much promise in
that respect.The literature attempting to define what sustain-
able development means and how to implement it as a coordi-
nating policy principle is burgeoning.' The prevailing definition
of sustainable development at the international level comes from
the 1987 Brundtland Report of the World Commission on Envi-
ronment and Development: "[A] process of change in which the
exploitation of resources, the direction of investments, the orien-
tation of technological development and institutional change are
all in harmony and enhance both current and future potential to
meet human needs and aspirations." '3
Further, we have learned from the President's Commission
on Sustainable Development what these international ideals
mean for the United States:
A sustainable United States will have a growing economy
that provides equitable opportunities for satisfying liveli-
hoods and a safe, healthy, high quality of life for current
235. See id at 38 (indicating that resourcism is "reductive and ignores nonre-
sources" and that "classic preservationism is driven by nonbiological concerns7).
236. See id. (concluding that resourcism fails to take nonresources into account
and that preservationism focuses on nonbiological concerns).
237. See id. at 34 (explaining that sustainable development is a relatively recent
concept "betrothed to neoclassical economics").
238. See WORLD FUTURE SOVY, ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES AND SUSTAINABLE
FUTURES (Michael Marien ed., 1996) (abstracting 450 books and identifying 170 pe-
riodicals dealing with sustainable development and related topics). Information
about international efforts to implement and coordinate sustainable development is
available from the United Nations Division for Sustainable Development's home
page, <http-//www.un.orgdpcsdldsd.htm> (last visited Sept. 2, 1997).
239. WORLD COM'N ON ENVT & DEV., OUR COMMON FUTURE 46 (1987). See
also AGENDA 21: THE EARTH SUMIAIT STRATEGY TO SAVE OUR PLANET 39 (Daniel Si-
tarz ed., 1994) (declaring that "[a]ltering consumption patterns is one of humanity's
greatest challenges in the quest for environmentally sound and sustainable devel-
opment").
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and future generations. Our nation will protect its envi-
ronment, its natural resource base, and the functions and
viability of natural systems on which all life depends.24
It is no accident that these definitions eschew alignment
with either the preservationism or resourcism orientations-
terms such as sustainable growth and sustainable environment
would not have transcended the debate.241 Sustainable develop-
ment, however, implies that an economy can thrive and meet
human needs without necessarily growing in the sense of in-
creased throughput of resources. " But it also implies that eco-
nomic prosperity matters and that resources must be used to
maintain social equity.243 Indeed, many diehard capitalists and
environmentalists alike have begun to realize that the best busi-
ness opportunity of the future is environmental sustainability.".
and that the best environmental protection opportunity of the fu-
ture is economic sustainability.
2 45
Sustainable development, the combination of economic and
environmental sustainability, has always been a necessity. Usu-
ally, however, the reality of the need to practice sustainable devel-
opment has only become apparent in advanced cases of localized
240. PRESIDENTS COUNCIL ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, SUSTAINABLE
AMERICA at i (1996) (quoting the Council's Vision Statement).
241. Indeed, one measure of the success of the international and national efforts
to define sustainable development has been their ability to balance between the two
poles as reflected by the amount of criticism the extremists from both camps have
aimed at that balanced approach. See, e.g., Bill Willers, Sustainable Development: A
New World Deception, 8 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1146, 1146-47 (1994) (criticizing
the sustainable development model from the preservationist perspective). As soon as
sustainable development becomes a reconstituted version of preservationism or re-
sourcism, it has failed.
242. See Callicott & Mumford, supra note 232, at 34 (referring to sustainable
development as a concept that should be thought of as equal to increased efficiency).
"Growth implies quantitative physical or material increase; development implies
qualitative improvement or at least change .... Our planet develops over time with-
out growing. Our economy, a subsystem of the finite and nongrowing earth, must
eventually adapt to a similar pattern of development without throughput growth."
Robert Goodland, The Concept of Environmental Sustainability, 26 ANN. REV.
ECOLOGY & SYSTEMATICS 1, 9 (1995).
243. See Goodland, supra note 242, at 2 (suggesting that general sustainability
should be based on all three aspects of sustainability--"environmental, social, and
economic"); Fen Osler Hampson & Judith Reppy, Environmental Change & Social
Justice, ENVIRONMENT, Apr. 1997, at 12, 13 (emphasizing that social sustainability
must deal with how to account for the interests of disenfranchised populations, such
as indigenous populations, the poor, and unborn generations).
244 See, e.g., Hart, supra note 115, at 67 (commenting on the fact that many
companies are "going green," which reduces pollution and increases profits simulta-
neously).
245. See, e.g., Paul Hawken, Natural Capitalism, MOTHER JONES, Mar.-Apr.
1997, at 40, 60 (envisioning a resource productivity revolution in the future, prom-
ising a more efficient economy and thereby environmental protection).
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unsustainable development. Cases of social collapse caused by
unsustainable development abound in history.2" Today's move-
ment to define sustainable development as an explicit policy tool
is merely a reflection of the mounting reality that unsustainable
development is becoming more likely in more settings, even to
the point of being a global possibility. Sustainable development,
in other words, must be a deliberate practice in today's world-a
guiding principle for all social decisions.
To be sure, whether the prevailing definitions of sustainable
development turn out to be more useful than simple bumper
sticker slogans such as "think globally, act locally" will depend
on the implementation follow-through. However, it should not be
a concern that the definitions are open-ended and nonprescrip-
tive. Many of the issues that motivate discussion of sustainable
development-such as climate change, depletion of stratospheric
ozone, persistent organic pollutants, loss of biodiversity, ocean
degradation, and the like-are truly world-wide in scale and re-
quire world-wide responses at all levels of organization from in-
ternational to local. 7 But environmental policy is not unique in
that respect, as other social policy issues such as economic pros-
perity, democracy, political repression, and gender and race dis-
crimination operate globally from top to bottom. Yet we do not
demand detailed "definitions" of democracy and justice in order
to agree that they are useful concepts that should be expressed
as international, national, provincial, and local goals for ad-
dressing those social problems. We have no more reason to de-
fine sustainable development beyond the broad ideals captured
by the Brundtland Commission. That alone, however, is truly a
revolutionary development in environmental policy.
246. See CLAYTON & RADCLIFFE, supra note 14, at 3 (providing "the Old King-
dom of Egypt around 1950 BC, the Sumerians in 1800 BC, the Maya at about 600
AD and of the Polynesians of Easter Island at about 1600 AD" as examples of civili-
zations that collapsed due to environmental degradation); Linda S. Cordell, Models
and Frameworks for Archaeological Analysis of Resource Stress in the American
Southwest, in EVOLVING COMPLEXITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL RISK IN THE PRE-
HISTORIC SOUTHWEST at 251, 261 (Joseph A. Tainter & Bonnie Bagley Tainter eds.,
1996) (relating that cultural environment is closely related to natural environment).
247. A number of commentators have begun to explore how sustainable devel-
opment translates into local land use and environmental polices. See, e.g., Jon
Chandler, Regional Growth Means Achievable Growth, NAT. RESOURCES L. INST.
NEWS, Summer 1996, at 11, 11 (observing the policies of the city of Portland, Ore-
gon); James Longhurst et al., Towards Sustainable Airport Development, 16 THE
ENVIRONhENTALIsT 197, 197-201 (1996) (applying sustainable development princi-
ples to the level of a single airport development); J.B. Ruhl, Taming the Suburban
Amoeba in the Ecosystem Age: Some Do's and Don'ts, 3 WIDENER SYMP. L.J. _
(forthcoming) (applying sustainable development principles to suburban growth is-
sues) (draft on file with the Houston Law Review).
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2. Process: Adaptive Management. The process principle for
modern environmental law has been the command-and-control
model carried out through so-called cooperative federalism.4 '
This model has proven to be a tremendously nonadaptive
process, as decisions, once made, tend to lock into place. It is
unlikely that the policy principle of sustainable development can
be given life through the ossified command-and-control regime.
The alternative approach emerging increasingly at many dif-
ferent levels of decision making is known as adaptive manage-
ment. Adaptive management's strongest champion is Kai Lee,
who defines it as applying "the concept of experimentation to the
design and implementation of natural-resource and environ-
mental policies."249 The point is to move decision making out of
the laboratory modeling approach and into the field, and to open
the process up to continuous change based on a continuous input
of information and analysis. 5 ' The factors Lee describes as re-
quiring this experimentalist approach in environmental policy
are straight out of complex adaptive systems theory: "The be-
havior of natural systems is incompletely understood. Predic-
tions of behavior are accordingly incomplete and often incorrect.
These facts do not decrease the value of models, but they do
make it clear that ecosystem models are not at all like engi-
neering models of bridges or oil refineries." 5'
Indeed, Lee points out that the behavior of human systems
is equally unclear, and, hence, we do not really know how to get
to either a sustainable economy or sustainable development.22
Failure to experiment, in other words, would be folly. Lee's early
work applying that approach to the Columbia River ecosystem
has led other commentators to propose an even broader agenda
of adaptive management in environmental policy,"3 which is be-
ginning to take hold in concrete policy proposals' and govern-
ment programs.25
248. Refer to note 190 supra and accompanying text (discussing cooperative fed-
eralism and the command and control system).
249. LEE, supra note 218, at 53.
250. See George Frampton, Ecosystem Management in the Clinton Administra-
tion, 7 DUKE ENvTL. L. & POLY F. 39, 45 (1996) (commenting that adaptive man-
agement calls for continuous revision and adjustment of plans as conditions change).
251. LEE, supra note 218, at 61.
252. See id. at 8 (asserting that, in order to achieve an environmentally sustain-
able economy, we must first learn to understand the relationship between humans
and nature and the relationships among people).
253. See THE KEYSTONE CTR., THE KEYSTONE NATIONAL POLICY DIALOGUE ON
ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT 15-21 (1996)
254. See id. (advocating adaptive management techniques as the framework for
ecosystem management).
255. See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, & NATIONAL
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3. Performance: Biological Diversity. The method of
measuring the performance of environmental law thus far has
depended heavily on a "bean counter" mentality.' We count the
number of endangered species, the volume of contaminants, the
number of acres preserved, the number of enforcement actions,
and so on. While these measures are useful to the command-and-
control regime, they do not offer much to the adaptive
management approach.
As Lee explains, the adaptive management approach is hun-
gry for information. 7 When applied to the sustainable develop-
ment policy, therefore, adaptive management requires informa-
tion regarding economic, social, and environmental
sustainability.' Measures of economic and social sustainability
at international, national, and local levels abound already, al-
though some commentators have argued they must be refined in
order more accurately to take into account resource uses and de-
pletions."s Where we are sorely lacking, by contrast, is in the
field of information regarding environmental sustainability.
The emerging measure of environmental sustainability,
known as biological diversity or biodiversity,"C9 has galvanized
MARINE FISHERIES SERV., U.S. DEPIr OF COMMERCE, ENDANGERED SPECIES
HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANNING HANDBOOK 3-24 to 3-26 (1996) (advocating the
use of adaptive management techniques in permitting under the Endangered Spe-
cies Act); Frampton, supra note 250, at 45-46 (discussing use of adaptive manage-
ment methods in endangered species protection programs).
256. Refer to notes 197-98 supra and accompanying text.
257. See LEE, supra note 218, at 9 (relating that adaptive management takes
special care with information, transforming it into learning).
258. Refer to note 250-55 supra and accompanying text.
259. See, e.g., Abramovitz, supra note 5, at 112-13; Robert Repetto, Earth in the
Balance Sheet: Incorporating Natural Resources in National Income Accounts,
ENVIRONIENT, Sept. 1992, at 13, 43 (suggesting that national accounting systems
change in order to accurately reflect resource capital depletion).
260. See WILSON, supra note 84, at 393 (defining biodiversity as "Itihe variety of
organisms considered at all levels, from genetic variants belonging to the same spe-
cies through arrays of species to arrays of genera, families, and still higher taxo-
nomic levels"); see also U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, THREATS TO BIOLOGICAL
DIVERSITY IN THE UNITED STATES 10 (1990) (regarding biological diversity as 'the
variety of life on all levels of organization, represented by the number and relative
frequencies of items"); Convention on Biological Diversity, 31 WItL LEGAL MA-
TERIALS 818, 823 (1992) (stating that biological diversity is "the variability among
living organisms from all sources... [which] includes diversity within species, be-
tween species, and of ecosystems"). The focus of scientific research geared towards
ecosystem-level dynamics has revealed the dramatic impact that habitat loss has
had on biodiversity. See, e.g., Edward T. LaRoe, Biodiversity: A New Challenge, in
OUR LIVING RESOURCES 6, 6-7 (Edward T. LaRoe et al. eds., 1995) (discussing the
rapidly increasing rate of extinction and the impact it vll likely have on the earth);
REED F. NOSS ET AL., NATIONAL BIOLOGICAL SERV., U.S. DEPr OF THE INTERIOR,
BIOLOGICAL REP. 28, ENDANGERED ECOSYSTEMIS OF THE UNITED STATES 14 (1995)
(inferring that the decline in wetlands has contributed to the rise in endangered spe-
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both the scientific and policy communities. The relatively new
discipline of conservation biology 61 tells us that biodiversity is
the building block of conservation policy as the basic measure of
ecosystem health.262 Regardless of whatever debate might exist
over the rate of loss of biodiversity, it appears widely accepted
that biodiversity provides a strong index of ecological sustain-
ability263 and that we are generally experiencing more losses than
gains globally.2 " Accordingly, programs such as the National
Biological Information Infrastructure26 and the Gap Analysis
Program... are now used as means of improving environmental
cies dependent on wetlands); Scott K. Robinson et al., Regional Forest Fragmenta-
tion and the Nesting Success of Migratory Birds, 267 SCIENCE 1987, 1987 (1995)
(noting that habitat fragmentation may have caused the population decline of mi-
grant birds). For a summary of the biodiversity conservation policy formulation ini-
tiatives of 18 federal agencies, see generally CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., No.
94-339 ENR, ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT: FEDERAL AGENCY ACTIVITIES (April 19,
1994).
261. Conservation biology has emerged as a biological sciences discipline largely
in the past decade, as traced by its chief literature and research outlet, the journal
Conservation Biology. See Goals and Objectives of the Society for Conservation Biol-
ogy, 8 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY at i (1994) (stating that the goal of conservation biol-
ogy is "to help develop the scientific and technical means for the protection, mainte-
nance, and restoration of life on this planet-its species, its ecological and
evolutionary processes, and its particular and total environment").
262. See Callicott & Mumford, supra note 232, at 39 (observing that healthy
ecosystems result from biodiversity and ecological integrity and that biological di-
versity is a major indicator of ecosystem health).
263. See Reice, supra note 76, at 428-30 (relating that community structure is
dependent on the biodiversity in the area).
264. See Christopher Flavin, The Legacy of Rio, in STATE OF THE WORLD 1997,
2, 13-16 (Linda Starke ed., 1997).
265. The National Biological Information Infrastructure ("NBII") began in 1993
as a distinct bureau of the Department of the Interior known as the National Bio-
logical Survey. See NBII Brochure Homepage <http'//www.nbs.gov> (last visited
Nov. 16, 1997). The program name later was changed to National Biological Service
("NBS"), and subsequent to that the program was merged into the United States
Geological Survey ("USGS") as the Biological Resources Division ("BRD"). See id.
The NBII is a BRD led initiative. Id. The BRD was created by consolidating the bio-
logical research, inventory and monitoring, and information transfer programs of
seven different Department of the Interior bureaus. See id. Today the BRD is a non-
regulatory, non-managerial, non-advocacy science agency with over 1800 employees
and a $137 million annual budget; its principal function is to maintain the NBII, an
evolution of the original NBS concept. See id. The goal of the NBII is to develop an
'electronic 'federation' of biological data and information sources," and to provide
access to such information. Id.
266. The Gap Analysis Program ("GAP") refers to a state-based cooperative pro-
gram using Geographic Information Systems ("GIS") technology to map major indi-
cators of biodiversity over states, along with the existing network of conservation
lands. See A. Ross Kiester et al., Conservation Prioritization Using GAP Data, 10
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1332, 1333 (1996). GAP, which is coordinated by the USGS
Biological Resources Division, currently is made up of 430 coordinating units in 43
states. See id. GAP has become an important component of conservation biology re-
search. See id.
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decision making by increasing the availability, uniformity, and
scope of information regarding biodiversity. The new policy
model that has emerged from the combination of those efforts is
known as "ecosystem management," which increasingly has be-
come synonymous with adaptive management.
In order to make information about biological diversity most
useful to the adaptive management approach, a number of re-
searchers have embarked on an effort to translate biological di-
versity information into hard data on the value of nature to the
goal of sustainable development. This effort goes beyond the fa-
miliar mantra that biodiversity is valuable because the cure for
cancer could be found in some bug in Brazil. That possibility of-
fers very little in terms of guidance as to which ecosystem to pre-
serve since every ecosystem has roughly an equal chance of
housing that proverbial bug.2" Rather, we are discovering that
we can translate nature into its service values, such as the value
of wild honeybee pollination to agriculture, of water filtering by
wetlands, of carbon cycling by forests, and so on.2 ' As Professor
James Salzman has posited, these valuations of "nature's serv-
ices" can be used to create indices of ecosystem sustainability,
which, when combined with improved economic and social sus-
tainability indices, can be used the same way Wall Street uses
stock performance indices to make adaptive decisions." Hence,
267. For excellent overviews of the ecosystem management philosophy, includ-
ing its application through adaptive management techniques, see THE KEYSTONE
CTR., supra note 253, at 5-22; STEVEN L. YAFFEE ET AL., ECOSYSTEM MANAGE1MENT
IN THE UNITED STATES 35-38 (1996) (reviewing recommendations for future ecosys-
tem management projects); R. Edward Grumbine, Reflections on 'What is Ecosystem
Management?", 11 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 41, 41-42 (1997) (revisiting ecosystem
management themes and highlighting the lessons and dilemmas of putting the con-
cept into practice); R. Edward Grumbine, What Is Ecosystem Management?, 8
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 27, 28, 31 (1994) (explaining that ecosystem management
is a response to the current biodiversity crisis and identifying adaptive management
as a dominant theme of ecosystem management); and Rebecca W. Thomson, Ecosys-
tem. Management: Great Idea, But What Is It, Will It Work, and Who Will Pay?, NAT.
RESOURCES & ENVW, Winter 1995, at 42, 70-72 (pointing out the difficulties of the
ecosystem management approach, including the barriers presented by adaptive
management--continuous monitoring and assessment and the modification of man-
agement choices on the basis of new information").
268. See Conservation Strategies, ENVIRONMENT, May 1997, at 22, 22
(suggesting that the number of species that could lead to a valuable product is so
large that the probability that any one species will do so is very small).
269. See CENTER FOR RESOURCES ECONS., NATURE'S SERVICES 177-254
(Gretchen C. Daily ed., 1997) (providing a comprehensive review from various
authors of what is already known about ecosystem services, how the information can
be transformed into valuation estimations that can be used to better understand
human impact on ecosystems, and the monumental research agenda that will need
to be implemented to create a sufficient information source upon which to base reli-
able decisions).
270. See James Salzman, Valuing Ecosystem Services, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. -
(forthcoming) (calling for integration of "robust, quantified indicators of ecosystem
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the new measures of environmental health found in the concepts
of biodiversity and valuation of nature's services converge neatly
with notions of adaptive management and sustainable develop-
ment.
V. CONCLUSION-WHOSE VIEW OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW WILL
BE IRRELEVANT IN TWENTY YEARS?
Is it an accident that sustainable development, adaptive
management, and biodiversity were unheard of in the environ-
mental policy debates of twenty years ago and today are the sta-
ple of conferences, symposia, and journals? I think not. Rather,
the evolution of environmental law has led us to this point pre-
cisely because these three concepts are related and because they
are consistent with the vision of law as a complex adaptive sys-
tem. Thus, Gerald Emison's exploration of complex systems as a
model for environmental law reaches a similar set of conclusions
as to the direction of reform through which he advocates a sys-
tem designed to: (1) get accurate, detailed information; (2) chal-
lenge sources to achieve measurable goals for sustained progress;
(3) use all parts of the environmental management system; (4)
use incentives to promote responsible behavior; (5) pay close at-
tention to implementation; (6) make innovation a priority; and
(7) emphasize flexibility.271 I posit that the legal apparatus, for
turning those approaches into reality, is "gelling" through the
trio of loosely defined organizing principles known as sustainable
development, adaptive management, and biodiversity, and that
the critical mass behind that transformation has reached the
point at which the process of change will not be stopped.
services" into a new "ecosystem jurisprudence" to improve regulatory decision mak-
ing, provide information relevant to market-based approaches, and assist in reach-
ing conclusions as to causality) (draft on file with the Houston Law Review). This
approach is being actively pursued by international and national organizations. See,
e.g., United Nations Department for Policy Coordination and Sustainable Develop-
ment, From Theory to Practice: Indicators of Sustainable Development (visited Oct.
3, 1997) <http:/vww.un.ogr/dpcsd/dsd/indi6.htm> (discussing the Work Programme
on Indicators of Sustainable Development of the United Nation Commission on Sus-
tainable Development); WORLD RESOURCES INST., ENVIRONMENTAL INDICATORS 11-
17 (1995).
271. See Emison, supra note 14, at 187-92; see also Kenneth L. Rosenbaum, The
Challenge of Achieving Sustainable Development Through Law, 27 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10455 (1997). Suggesting the same criticism of reductionist envi-
ronmental policies that I make, Rosenbaum observes that "the complexity of the
world leads the law to split problems into pieces, and the splits inevitably cause
complications." Id. at 10457. He advocates working toward sustainable development
as the goal, through increased reliance on feedback and flexibility. See id. at 10460-
61.
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The real question, of course, is who will win the debate over
how to shape the legal framework within which those three
themes either flourish or dissipate. I make no bones about it: my
view of the environmental law of the future is vastly different
from the one portrayed by the "incrementalists."' The problems
of the next two decades-population growth, climate change,
malnutrition, disease, and so on-no longer seem to be incre-
mental, linear extensions of the problems of the past. Why
should we expect that incremental changes in law will address
those problems adequately? Does it make any sense, for example,
to think of overlaying the Endangered Species Act on China or
Ethiopia? How much more reasonable is it to think we can ac-
complish change domestically on behalf of endangered species
through federal flat? Incrementalism eventually will become ir-
relevant simply because it will prove decreasingly useful in an-
swering those and similar questions.
The primary objection I expect to hear to my view of envi-
ronmental law is that it does not allow us today to produce a
script of objective, uniform, predictable, and easily enforceable
standards to be applied for the foreseeable future. It is not a
"litigable" body of law to apply. Precisely! If adaptability means
we have less law to apply, then let us have less law to apply. If
adaptability means that planning horizons for business and gov-
ernment shrink, then let them shrink. The whole point of ap-
plying complex adaptive systems analysis to law is to demon-
strate that efforts to cling to a highly predictable, stable, rule-
habituated system of law undermine the adaptability of law to
its changing subject matter. The framework for carrying out sus-
tainable development necessarily must be loose, relying heavily
on inclusive negotiation forums operating at all levels of gov-
ernment and less on centralized fiat. Our efforts should be di-
rected toward creating the legal frameworks within which those
processes can flourish.273 The point is to design environmental
272. Refer to Part M.B.1 supra (referring to current environmental policy as
incremental).
273. For an example of what I have in mind, see Ruhl, Biodiversity Conserva-
tion, supra note 219, at 661-71. Briefly, I propose a legal regime for biodiversity con-
servation which would allow state and local governments to identify "biological re-
source zones." See id. at 663-65. Once a zone is identified, the nonfederal entities
would submit land use and environmental management plans for the zone to the
federal government, which would evaluate whether the plan will lead to overall bio-
diversity conservation and environmental quality within the zone equal to or greater
than that which would be achieved under the other federal environmental laws, such
as the ESA and Clean Water Act. See i& at 669-70. If that finding is made, the non-
federal entities would administer the land use plan within the zone, in return for
which the operation of the other federal laws would be suspended. See id. at 670-71.
The plan would be reevaluated periodically and adjusted as needed.
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law to protect the environment, not to protect the law and law-
yers.
The last three decades of environmental law, the command-
and-control era of so-called "cooperative federalism," made great
strides by taking shortcuts around the reality that the subject mat-
ter of environmental law is a set of complex adaptive systems. But
shortcuts can only work for so long. We find ourselves staring into
the reality of environmental policy as never before, asking questions
like: Will we be able to sustain the planet, and for how long?" There
are no simple answers to those questions; rather, we will have to re-
sign ourselves to having to answer and reanswer those questions
over and over, taking risks along the way through experimentation,
though with the benefit of as much information as we can collect.
The process will be a mess! It will not be easy, or inexpensive, or
something we can leave to only a few "experts" in centralized ad-
ministrative agencies to carry out. We will never be able to rest from
the task, but if we are right in asking questions of that magnitude,
then we should demand nothing less of ourselves.
The single greatest obstacle to getting there, to even beginning
to talk about how to get there, is trust, specifically overcoming the
complete lack of trust that personifies today's environmental law
and policy.275 When I hear someone'say they need "litigable stan-
dards" and "verifiable compliance," what I really hear is that they
do not trust the other party with whom they are dealing. As Francis
Fukuyama has observed, "[Pleople who do not trust one another will
end up cooperating only under a system of formal rules and regula-
tions, which have to be negotiated, agreed to, litigated, and en-
forced, sometimes by coercive means."276 To think of environmental
law as a complex adaptive system-to deliberately reshape envi-
ronmental law around the new organizing principles of sustainable
development, adaptive management, and biodiversity-we will need
to trust one another.277 That will prove hard for many who have
lived through the grenade throwing days of the past three decades.
But when you stop and consider the very imminent future of a
planet with over ten billion people on it, do we have any choice?
274. Refer to Part IV.A.1 supra and accompanying text (reviewing the command
and control structure and cooperative federalism).
275. See Ruckelshaus, supra note 215, at 27-28 (commenting on the steady ero-
sion of trust in all institutions, at the epicenter of which is the EPA).
276. FRANCIS FuKuyAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF
PROSPERITY 27 (1995).
277 In their prescription for improving environmental law, which focuses on
many of the themes raised here, Dan Beardsley and colleagues call for installing a
"process for implementing new initiatives that features open exchange of informa-
tion, sensible levels of stakeholder participation, and, if possible, trust." Beardsley,
supra note 209, at 8.
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